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A LAWYER’S HIDDEN PERSUADER:
GENRE BIAS AND HOW IT SHAPES LEGAL
TEXTS BY CONSTRAINING WRITERS’
CHOICES AND INFLUENCING READERS’
PERCEPTIONS
Bret Rappaport
Shapes of knowledge are always ineluctably local,
indivisible from their instruments and encasements.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Instruments of knowledge are what we call “texts,” and the
encasements for those texts are what are called “genres.” Genres
Author’s Note: A shorter version of this article was presented at The Impact of
Cognitive Bias on Persuasion and Writing Strategies Conference, hosted by
Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn, New York, on March 1, 2013.
* Mr. Rappaport is a practicing attorney, an Adjunct Professor at Dominican
University, River Forest, Illinois, where he teaches composition, and seminars
on philosophy and sociology, and a former Legal Writing Instructor at DePaul
University College of Law. Mr. Rappaport holds an M.A. in Writing & Rhetoric
from DePaul University. I would like to thank the Honorable Richard Posner for
his pointed (and helpful) criticism of an earlier draft of this article. Additionally,
I want to thank University of Missouri St. Louis Professor Joseph Carroll for
assistance with this article and for inspiring my overall scholarly efforts to link
evolution and cognitive psychology to legal writing. I also thank Professor
Michael Sinding of Amsterdam University and Professor Vijay K. Bhatia of
City University of Hong Kong for their suggestions, as well as my colleagues
Bethany Schols and Ellen McManus for their edits. And to Jina, thank you for
your never-ending encouragement of my scholarship over all these decades.
1
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 4 (1983); see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Blurred
Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER
ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 19 (1983) (exploring the effect of
genres in the humanities on sociological understanding).
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are a cognitive process of classification that channel thinking and
thereby influence individuals’ communicative actions.2 Genres are
also central to human communication, understanding, and
persuasion.3 It is “impossible to . . . dwell in the social world
without repertoires of typified social responses in recurrent
situations”4 and therefore, we rely on genres to shape our writing
and speech and to make each of them “a recognizable response to
the exigencies of the situation.”5 In this way, genre is “a situated
form of cognition”6—and thus a powerful bias.7
What this article titles “genre bias” is a cognitive short cut that
allows us to more quickly process and better understand text.
While such biases can affect our approach and interpretation of a
text; the genre bias can also reinforce our sense of self by fulfilling
expectations. In many ways, this is one reason why we find fiction
compelling, news informative, and jokes funny.
A simple test demonstrates the power of the genre bias—
genre’s power to skew one’s approach to and interpretation of a
text (a bias). Assume the following paragraph comes from a novel
entitled Murder at Marplethorpe:
The clock on the mantelpiece said ten thirty, but
2

See Joanne Yates & Wanda J. Orlikowski, Genres of Organizational
Communication: A Structural Approach to Studying Communication and Media,
17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 299, 300–02 (1992); see also Michael Sinding, After
Definitions: Genre, Categories, and Cognitive Science, 35 GENRE 181, 193
(2002) [hereinafter Sinding, After Definitions] (“Genre knowledge is not
specialist understanding, but rather functional or interactive capacity . . . to
recognize new as well as existing members of the genre by their own features, to
understand conventions and how to respond to them.”).
3
See Sinding, After Definitions, supra note 2, at 181–82, 213–14.
4
The terms “recurrent” situation and “recurring” situation are used
interchangeably in this article.
5
Carol Berkenkotter & Thomas N. Huckin, Rethinking Genre from a
Sociocognitive Perspective, 10 WRITTEN COMM. 475, 482 (1993) [hereinafter
Berkenkotter & Huckin, Rethinking Genre].
6
ANNA TROSBORG, ANALYSING PROFESSIONAL GENRES viii (2000); see
also CAROL BERKENKOTTER & THOMAS N. HUCKIN, GENRE KNOWLEDGE IN
DISCIPLINARY COMMUNICATION: COGNITION/CULTURE/POWER 3 (1995)
(asserting that genre knowledge is “a form of situated cognition”).
7
William J. Clancy, Situated Action: A Neuropsychological Interpretation
Response to Vera and Simon, 17 COGNITIVE SCI. 87, 95 (1983).
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someone had suggested recently that the clock was
wrong. As the figure of the dead woman lay on the
bed in the front room, a no less silent figure glided
rapidly from the house. The only sounds to be heard
were the ticking of that clock and the loud wailing
of an infant.8
Now read it again, and assume the title is The Personal History
of David Marplethorpe.9 The difference is palpable.
In this famous example of the power of genre to channel the
reader’s understanding of a text, English professor Heather
Dubrow asks readers to consider how the meaning of the text
changes based on the assigned genre.10 As a piece of detective
fiction, “the inaccuracy of the clock and the fact that the woman
lies dead in the front room become important clues [and] the figure
gliding away assumes a particular subject role within the discourse,
the subject role of suspect.”11 As a coming-of-age autobiography,
the reader places a “different significance on the dead body or the
fact that the clock is inaccurate.”12 Certainly, in such a novel we
will be less likely to look for a suspect. That is, we will not be
reading with “detective eyes” as we would if we were reading
detective fiction. As Dubrow suggests, in a coming-of-age
autobiography the crying baby will become more central to the
meaning and even become the very David Marplethorpe whose
story is being told.13
While literature is often thought of as synonymous with genre
generally, you would be hard pressed find a profession more
immersed in this normative force of genre bias than the field of

8

HEATHER DUBROW, GENRE 1 (1982).
Id.
10
Id. at 3. This can go on and on with alternative titles as college English
teachers seek to help their students understand genre. For example, what if the
title were “The Vampire of Marplethorpe” or “Marplethorpe Home Security?”
See Melanie Kill, Thinking About Genre, UNIV. OF WASH. (2007),
available
at
http://courses.washington.edu/webrhet/bis384/documents/
thinkingaboutgenre.pdf.
11
Anis Bawarshi, The Genre Function, 62 C. ENG. 335, 342 (2000).
12
Id.
13
Id.
9
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law.14 Thus it would seem natural that a complete understanding of
legal writing—including how and why it works—is achieved only
with an appreciation of genre bias, a new phrase for an innate
phenomenon. Genre bias, as a central part of genre, must be
appreciated by lawyers and judges because “understanding the
genres of written communication in one’s field is . . . essential to
professional success.”15 Yet, remarkably, genre bias remains
largely unexplored by legal writing instructors and entirely
unappreciated by practicing lawyers. This Article aims to change
that.
Practitioners of the law are varied. They include leasing
lawyers, transactional lawyers, patent lawyers, criminal lawyers,
appellate lawyers, trial lawyers, immigration lawyers,
environmental lawyers, law professors, criminal judges, divorce
judges, and so on. Each practitioner thinks like a lawyer,16 and
14

See Karen Petroski, Statutory Genres: Substance, Procedure,
Jurisdiction, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 189, 252 (2012) (“Legal theory and doctrine
have long explored the normative force of particular instances of
communication, as well as particular instances of categorization. Many (though
not all) such questions are internalized in legal training and addressed in
doctrine. The legally trained intuitively, if not explicitly, understand that
particular instances of classification gain their normative force as a result of
processes similar to those described by genre theorists. Some individuals and
institutions—such as legislators, law revision committees, legal publishers,
judges, and treatise authors—are accorded authority, by social practice and other
institutional mechanisms, to make classifications that others will treat as having
normative force.”) (citation omitted).
15
TROSBORG, supra note 6, at vii.
16
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO
THINK LIKE A LAWYER (2007); see also Christoph A. Hafner, A MultiPerspective Genre Analysis of the Barrister’s Opinion: Writing Context,
Generic Structure, and Textualization, 27 WRITTEN COMM. 411, 413 (2010)
(“Legal reasoning, frequently referred to as ‘thinking like a lawyer’ can be
conceived of as a form of rule-based reasoning, in which abstract principles of
law are applied to given factual situations, in order to determine the rights and
duties of the parties to a dispute.”). Some call this idea of “thinking like a
lawyer” a broad type of genre—a meta-genre. See Vijay K. Bhatia, Legal
Genres, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGES & LINGUISTICS 1, 1–2 (Keith
Brown et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter Bhatia, Legal Genres]; see also Janet
Giltrow, Meta-Genre, in THE RHETORIC AND IDEOLOGY OF GENRE: STRATEGIES
FOR STABILITY AND CHANGE 187, 195 (Richard M. Coe et al. eds., 2002)
(“[M]eta-genres are the atmospheres of wordings and activities, demonstrated
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while this mindset guides how lawyers view problems and facts,
each practice area has its own generic code17 which functions as a
kind of doorway permitting entry to a room that only those who
know and use the code can meaningfully access. These genres, as
well as the broader notion of thinking like a lawyer, function both
collectively and independently to guide and constrain the texts that
lawyers and judges use in specific circumstances18 and become
engrained in the practitioner’s mind.19
We humans are homo categorius. Our brains categorize things,
events, books, memories, socks, stocks, rocks, people, photos, and
just about everything we do, or are, or interact with.20 While not
precedents or sequestered expectations—atmospheres surrounding genres.”).
17
See, e.g., VIJAY K. BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE: LANGUAGE USE IN
PROFESSIONAL SETTINGS (1993) [hereinafter BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE];
JOHN GIBBONS, FORENSIC LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE IN
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2003); DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW
(2004); PETER TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE (2000); ENRIQUE ALCARAZ VARÓ &
BRIAN HUGHES, LEGAL TRANSLATION EXPLAINED (2002); Brenda Danet, Legal
Discourse, in HANDBOOK OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 270 (Teun A. Van Dijk ed.,
1985) [hereinafter Danet, Legal Discourse]; Brenda Danet, Language in the
Legal Process, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 445 (1980) [hereinafter Danet, Language].
18
Law library and law bookstore shelves are filled with legal writing text
books, how-to books and handbooks, all providing formats for memorandum,
briefs, pleadings, letters and the like. While these books offer a guide on how to
write as a lawyer, they do not delve into or even hint at the cognitive molding of
genre bias. Collectively and individually, these books do confirm the existence
of and need to adhere to the forms and norms of legal writing—the subgenres
that are practice area and document type. See, e.g., KENNETH A. ADAMS, LEGAL
USAGE IN DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS (2001); LINDA H. EDWARDS,
LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2011); ELIZABETH FAJANS ET. AL.,
WRITING FOR LAW PRACTICE: ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING (2d ed. 2010); JOYCE
J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK (5th ed. 2007); LAUREL
CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: ANALYSIS,
RESEARCH AND WRITING (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter LEGAL WRITING
HANDBOOK]; EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND APPELLATE
ARGUMENT (9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter BRIEF WRITING AND APPELLATE
ARGUMENT]; JANE N. RICHMOND, LEGAL WRITING: FORM AND FUNCTION
(2002); MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND
STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING (3d ed. 2012); JOHN SWALES, GENRE
ANALYSIS: ENGLISH IN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH SETTINGS (1980).
19
See infra Part V.
20
For more information on how humans categorize objects in terms of
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every object, every event, every memory, every person, or every
sock, stock, rock, picture, and book fits neatly into a specific
category, and even though there are often overlaps and gaps, and
misfits, we still cognitively categorize everything. This
categorization includes texts—literary, legal, or otherwise. This
categorization is a cognitive bias, and understanding this bias has
everything to do with being a more effective and persuasive legal
writer.
Genre is central to meaning-making21 and channeling thinking,
as either (or both) a generator for, or consequence of, the human
cognitive bias to categorize. Therefore, genre influences decisionmaking. Categories of legal writing have been studied, but the
study of genre as a cognitive bias in legal writing is uncharted
water. Genre bias in lawyerly texts (legal writing) is real and it
needs to be explored and appreciated. This Article seeks to do the
former; lawyers need to do the latter.
In this Article, Part II provides an overview of genre studies in
literature, which is the traditional home of such scholarship. After
exploring genre studies, mostly from the humanities, Part III of this
Article discusses the science of cognitive biases and the unicorn
that is the “rational” decision-maker. The discussion of these areas
of study uncovers a gap in need of a bridge. In Part IV, this Article
common attributes, such as physical features and function, see John R.
Anderson, The Adaptive Nature of Human Categorization, 98 PSYCHOL. REV.
409 (1991).
21
“Meaning making”, a concept in the humanities,
draws on multiple traditions in sociology, anthropology, and
other social sciences. At its root is the proposition that humans
constantly seek to understand the world around them, and that
the imposition of meaning on the world is a goal in itself, a
spur to action, and a site of contestation. Meaning includes
moral understandings of right and wrong, cognitive
understandings of true and false, perceptual understandings of
like and unlike, social understandings of identity and
difference, aesthetic understandings of attractive and
repulsive, and any other understandings that we may choose to
identify through our own academic processes of meaningmaking.
Charles Kurzman, Introduction Meaning-Making in Social Movements, 81
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 5, 5 (2008).
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builds that bridge by proposing that, in light of corresponding
scholarship in the humanities, neuroscience, and social science,
genre be considered a kind of cognitive bias.
Finally, with the bridge linking these areas of scholarship
firmly in place, in Part V, this Article crosses the newly laid planks
to apply genre bias to legal writing. This is done through a survey
approach, with a brief foray into the legal sub-genres of wills and
appellate briefs to highlight the importance of writing legal
documents to conform to the genre. This section includes
recommendations that practicing lawyers should almost never
break the established genre in litigation documents unless no other
good tactical choice remains and practicing lawyers should never
break transactional documents genres—ever. Part VI concludes
with an appeal to build on the genre analysis of legal writing
undertaken in this Article and by law professors Michael Smith
and Karen Sneddon along with humanities professors Vijay K.
Bhatia and Michael Sinding, among others.
In the end, lawyers who cross that bridge and understand legal
writing as, at least partially, a function of genre bias will better
comprehend how legal texts are conceived, received, and
perceived, and will be better lawyers as a consequence. The
practical applications of this understanding are legion. Lawyers
who conform their documents and pleadings to the correct genre
will take advantage of that reader’s genre bias. In this way, they
will have a cognitive head start as the reader is already prepped to
receive the substance of the text and is satisfied by recognizing
what he expected.
By contrast, lawyers who eschew the appropriate genre create a
cognitive hurdle that, in almost every case, runs counter to the
client’s best interests. To be sure, breaking the genre may cause the
reader to pause and take notice, but that is not the same thing as
achieving the result desired (and paid for) by the client.
Admittedly, judges and legal scholars are removed from those
same strictures of genre compliance because they do not serve
clients. Therefore, these legal writers are prone to occasionally
break the genre of opinions or law review articles. Still, judges and
legal scholars have an audience—an audience with expectations
precast by genre. Victor Hugo aptly wrote that “life is a theatre set
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in which there are but few practicable entrances.”22 Legal writing,
all legal writing, is also a theater set, with performers, a script, and
an audience. For the theater of legal writing, genre is not only the
most practical entrance, but the essential one.
II. LITERATURE ON GENRE STUDY
Traditionally, scholars viewed genre as a class of texts
“distinguished according to mutually exclusive and exhaustive
characteristics.”23 In this way, genre is “a category of composition
in music or literature, marked by a distinctive style, form, or
content.”24 Sometimes called a “folk conception of genre,”25 this
oldest line of genre study dating back to Aristotle analyzes literary
forms, such as poetry, prose, and plays.26 More recently, genre has
been pegged as a generative force vitally connected to social
action.27 This current description of genre expands the ancient
genre paradigm so genres today are most often defined as “ways of
recognizing, responding to, acting meaningfully within, and
22

Chapter IV: The Back Room of Café Musain, VICTOR
HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES, http://www.cartage.org.lb/en/themes/BookLibrary/
books/bibliographie/H/Hugovictor/LesMiserables/VolumeIII-Marius/book4/
ch4.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
23
George Kamberelis, Genre as Institutionally Informed Social Practice, 6
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 115, 118 (1995).
24
Judy M. Cornett, The Ethics of Blawging: A Genre Analysis, 41 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 221, 225–26 (2009) (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 757 (3d ed. 1992)); see also Anthony Chase, Toward a
Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 527, 564.
25
Petroski, supra note 14, at 246.
26
Cornett, supra note 24, at 226.
27
Social actions are the responses to “understanding how to participate in
the actions of a community.” Carolyn R. Miller, Genre as Social Action, 70 Q.J.
SPEECH 151, 165 (1984). See also ANIS S. BAWARSHI & MARY JO REIFF, GENRE,
AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY, THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PEDAGOGY 3–5
(2010); ALASTAIR FOWLER, KINDS OF LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF GENRES AND MODES (1982). In addition to the rhetorical and
categorical genre paradigms, there are three other means of studying genre:
genre in language studies, genre in systemic-functional linguistics and genre in
applied linguistics. See John Corbett, Genre and Genre Analysis, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS 26, 26–29 (Keith Brown et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2006).
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helping to reproduce recurrent situations.”28 Known more
particularly as rhetorical situations,29 these recurrent situations are
ones in which a speaker or writer can effect change. A simple
example of a rhetorical situation can be found at a school board
meeting where eliminating the art or gifted programs is being
discussed and decided. A parent, who is there speaking against the
cuts, finds herself in a rhetorical situation. Nearly everything a
lawyer does in his or her professional role takes place in a
rhetorical situation.
An influential work viewing genre this way is English
professor Carolyn R. Miller’s 1984 article, Genre as Social
Action.30 Miller points out that “situations are social constructs that
are the result, not of perception, but of “definition.”31 She explains
that this is so “because human action is based on and guided by
meaning, not by material causes. At the center of this action is the

28

BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 3.
According to Lloyd Bitzer, a rhetorical situation has three elements:
(1) Exigence: “An imperfection marked by urgency; it is a
defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing
which is other than it should be.” There are many different
kinds of exigencies, but a rhetorical one exists when discourse
can modify it positively;
(2) Audience: an “audience consists only of those persons who
are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being
mediators of change”; and
(3) Constraints “made up of persons, events, objects and
relations which are parts of the situation because they have the
power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the
exigence.”
Lloyd F. Blitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 1–14
(1968). Bazerman defines “rhetorical situations” as consisting of “all
the contextual factors shaping a moment in which a person feels called
upon to make symbolic statement.” CHARLES BAZERMAN, SHAPING
WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE: THE GENRE AND ACTIVITY OF THE
EXPERIMENTAL ARTICLE IN SCIENCE 8 n.10 (1988); see also Jason K.
Cohen, Attorneys at the Podium: A Plain-Language Approach to Using
the Rhetorical Situation in Public Speaking Outside the Courtroom, 8 J.
ALWD 73, 75–80 (2011).
30
See Miller, supra note 27.
31
Id. at 156.
29
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process of interpretation.”32 This is where genre, as a recurrent
significant action “based in recurrent situations,”33 comes into
play34 because genres and rhetorical situations are reciprocal.35 To
illustrate this point, English professor Amy J. Devitt of the
University of Kansas cites the example of a grocery list. A list is
considered a mundane grocery list because that simple document
lists groceries and is used for the purpose of creating the recurrent
situation of purchasing groceries by use of a list.36 Indeed, every
text produced within a genre “reinforces or remolds some aspect of
the genre.”37 Professor Kirsten K. Davis of Stetson University
College of Law notes that legal forms are like grocery lists in that
they “serve as an idealization of past legal experience . . . . [that]
formulates future experience,”38 but she avoids the term “genre.”
In one of the few law review articles that addresses genre,
literary professor George Kamberelis summarizes six
characteristics of genres, and genre bias can be inferred from the
final one on this list.39 Kamberelis writes that “for speakers and
writers, hearers and readers, genres function as [cognitive]
suppositional and metaphoric starting points for rhetorical and
interpretative action within . . . [professional] fields.”40 As
32

Id. at 159, 165.
Id. at 159.
34
See ANNE HERRINGTON & CHARLES MORAN, GENRE ACROSS THE
CURRICULUM 12 (2005).
35
See Katherine Hall Jamieson, Antecedent Genres as Rhetorical
Constraints, 61 Q.J. SPEECH 406 (1975) (arguing that antecedent genres and
recurrent situations can have a reciprocal relationship in eliciting rhetorical
responses).
36
See AMY J. DEVITT, WRITING GENRES 23–24 (2004).
37
BAZERMAN, supra note 29, at 8.
38
Kirsten K. Davis, Legal Forms As Rhetorical Transaction: Competency
in the Context of Information and Efficiency, 79 UMKC L. REV. 667, 689
(2011).
39
Kamberelis, supra note 23, at 121.
40
Id. The other five characteristics of genre are (1) genres, texts, and social
practices can be understood only when considered together; (2) within a
particular professional field, genres develop dynamically as durable forms of
communication are in relation to recurrent rhetorical situations; (3) rather than
simple, genres are “complex configurations of formal features” and thematic
content; (4) Genres originate from and belong to fairly specific professional
33
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discussed more fully below in the section on why not to break a
genre,41 Kamberelis cites the work of Adena Rosmarin, who
argues that genres function as “premises for arguments and
metaphors for thinking that allow people to begin, but not to
complete, acts of text production and interpretation.”42
In this way, legal writers—like poets, reporters, or novelists—
“view the world from generic perches.”43 It is from atop this perch
that the three cognitive stages of genre bias operate: pre-reading,
while-reading, and post-reading.44 In the pre-reading stage, the
reader forms the purpose for the applicable text and retrieves the
schema.45 The while-reading stage is the most cognitively
complex.46 In this stage, the reader engages in the text-perception
process, which involves recognizing the conventional formal
features of the genre and understanding the discourse semantics.47
In the post-reading stage, the reader who has just finished reading
the text now firmly assigns the genre and enriches the text with
schemata48 stored within his or her memory.49
fields; (5) Genres are acquired, “learned and used as a function of situated
practice” within certain settings and within specific professional fields. Id. at
120–21.
41
See infra Part V.C.3.a.
42
Kamberelis, supra note 23, at 156.
43
Id. at 155.
44
See Huijun Chen, A Cognitive Model for Recognition of Genre, 5 ASIAN
SOC. SCI. 25, 28 (2009). This process parallels the process of the writer. See also
Erika Abner & Shelley Kierstead, A Preliminary Exploration of the Elements of
Expert Performance in Legal Writing, 16 LEGAL WRITING 363, 369–70 (2010).
There are three basic text production processes of “planning [or] generating
concepts and setting goals to be achieved within the text; translating ideas into
text; and reviewing ideas and text [and] detecting faults at multiple levels.” Id.
(citation omitted).
45
Chen, supra note 44, at 28. In the process of reading, “the environment
sets up powerful expectations: we are already prepared for certain genres but not
for others before we open a newspaper, a scholarly journal or the box containing
some machine we have just bought.” SWALES, supra note 18, at 88.
46
Chen, supra note 44, at 28.
47
Id.
48
Schema (singular schemata) are mental structures for representing
generic concepts stored in memory. See generally DAVID EVERETT RUMELHART,
SCHEMATA: THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF COGNITION 38–58 (1980).
49
Chen, supra note 44, at 28. See infra Part IV for more discussion of
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Each of the above stages is essential in the persuasion process.
A “thread” through the entire cognitive process is the prior
knowledge of the genre characteristics and how genre functions
within the mind of both the writer and the reader.50 It is through
this cognitive process that genres become “scheme-text-practice
configurations that fuse form, content, and ideology”51 in rhetorical
situations for specific communities of practice. Accordingly,
genres operate as a cognitive bias.
III. LITERATURE ON COGNITIVE BIAS
It is more reassuring to us to undergo a medical procedure with
a ninety percent chance of success, compared with the same
treatment that holds a ten percent mortality rate.52 If asked, “How
old is Brad Pitt?” and then asked, “How old is Joe Biden?,” we
estimate the Vice President’s age to be higher than if first asked,
“How old is Joe Biden?,” and then asked, “How old is Brad
Pitt?”53 Losing $100 upsets more than finding $100 pleases.54
While the causes of these phenomena are complex and
multifactorial, “they are in part attributable to the fact that
cognition is plagued by blind spots, preconceived assumptions,
emotional influences, and built-in biases.”55 These biases are
hardwired into our neural circuitry.56
In 1974, psychology professors Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman wrote, in their landmark article, that humans have a
schemata.
50
Chen, supra note 44, at 29.
51
Kamberelis, supra note 23, at 154.
52
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 88 (2011).
53
See DEAN BUONOMANO, BRAIN BUGS: HOW THE BRAIN’S FLAWS SHAPE
OUR LIVES 150–51 (2011). In an informal experiment, when asked to estimate
actor Brad Pitt’s age before Vice President Joseph Biden’s, participants on
average estimated Pitt to be 42.9 years old and Biden to be 61.1 years old.
When asked Biden’s age before Pitt’s, participants on average estimated Pitt to
be 44.2 years old and Biden to be 64.7 years old. At the time, Brad Pitt was 45
years old, and Vice President Biden was 66 years old. Id. at 151.
54
Id. at 153.
55
Id. at 144.
56
Id. at 160–70.
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“heuristics and biases” approach to information processing.57
Predictions and judgments that we make intuitively are facilitated
by a small number of separate mental operations. Heuristic
examples58 include insensitivity to an outcome’s prior probability
of outcome, over-confidence in subjective probability distribution,
and false correlation.59 These heuristics are essential to information
processing, and, while they do have the advantage of increasing
cognitive speed and efficiency, these processes can also lead to
errors or biases when measured against reality.60 Thus, a cognitive
bias61 is “a replicable pattern in perceptual distortion, inaccurate
judgment, and illogical interpretation,”62 or put simply, a
57

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–31 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky
& Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases]. Heuristics, in simplest terms, are patterns
of thinking. The brain constructs mental shortcuts, algorithms, to process
information in an efficient manner. Over evolutionary time, these heuristics have
proven advantageous allowing human to navigate a complex cognitive world
quickly, and most of the time, to their evolutionary advantage. Cognitive biases
are heuristics gone awry because the environmental circumstances in which that
heuristic evolved has changed. See id. Daniel Kahneman was awarded the Nobel
Prize in Economics for his pioneering work, along with Amos Tversky, in
founding the discipline of behavioral economics which is based on cognitive
biases in decision-making. For more information, see generally KAHNEMAN,
supra note 52; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability
Judgment, 91 PSYCHOL. REV. 293 (1983) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman,
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning].
58
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive
Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582 (1996) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky,
Cognitive Illusions].
59
See Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 57, at
1124–26, 1128.
60
See id. at 1131.
61
Tversky & Kahneman use the terms “behavioral economics” or
“judgment and decision making (JDM)” to describe what more recent scholars
call “cognitive bias.”
62
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A
Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430–54 (1972)
[hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability]; see also DAN
ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
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systematic non-random error in thinking. For instance, people
remember occupations better than names.63 We recall that the man
on the plane is a baker, but we might forget that another man was
named “Baker.”64
A striking example of cognitive bias—because it operates even
if you are looking for it—is the brain’s misread of parallel images
in what is called the Leaning Tower Illusion.65 This is a
phenomenon where an image of the famous tower viewed from
below appears lopsided when placed next to a copy of itself.66

Brains presume that parallel lines, like railroad tracks,

DECISIONS (rev. ed. 2010) (recurrent irrationality in judgment and decision
making); JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (4th ed. 2007)
(rationality in judgment and decision making).
63
See Katherine H. McWeeny et al., Putting Names To Faces, 78 BRIT. J.
OF PSYCHOL. 143–49 (1987).
64
See id. at 146 (finding that participants in a study “recalled an occupation
without a name more often than s/he recalled a name without an occupation”);
see also BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 4; Deborah M. Burke et.al, On The Tip
Of The Tongue: What Causes Word Finding Failures In Young And Older
Adults?, 350 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 542–579 (1991) (concluding that proper
names are more difficult to learn and recall).
65
Frederick A. A. Kingdom et al., The Leaning Tower Illusion: A New
Illusion of Perspective, 36 PERCEPTION 475, 475–77 (2007).
66
Id.
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converge in the distance at a place called the vanishing point.67
When we look up at these parallel lines in the photo, they do not
converge,68 but stop at the sky. Our brains, programmed to see
parallel lines as converging, therefore interpret these lines as not
parallel when they in fact are.69 The lines are the same, but our
brains irrationally say that they are not.70 Despite this stark
evidence, we strongly cling to the myth of the purely rational
mind, including the mind of a decision-maker.
The traditional model of the decision-maker is that of a
mythical “rational” person, who applies an objective analysis
reason to a set of objective facts from which he or she deduces the
correct decision.71 While the falsity of this model is acknowledged
and studied widely in other disciplines,72 lawyers refuse to concede
that they are not entirely rational beings and are reluctant to even
acknowledge the issue.73 Yet some within the legal community
question the myth, if ever so slightly. For example, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Judge Marsha S. Berzon recently
conceded that “researchers have convincingly demonstrated that in
many instances people do not act as the robotic preference
maximizers the law often assumes them to be.”74 She concludes
that “it is not that humans are entirely irrational, but rather that our
rationality is bounded.”75 By and large, however, lawyers continue
67

See BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 144; see also James Galloway,
Perspectives on Mathematics in Art History, 16 MATH HORIZONS 16 (2008).
68
BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 144.
69
See Kingdom et al., supra note 65, at 475.
70
Id.
71
Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J.
ECON. 99, 99 (1955) [hereinafter Simon, Rational Choice]; see also ARIELY,
supra note 62; BARON, supra note 62.
72
See, e.g., ARIELY, supra note 62.
73
See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 777 (2001) (exploring cognitive bias in judicial decision making); Ian
Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal
Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783–834 (2003) (asserting that lawyers
must recognize cognitive bias in their clients and themselves to counsel
effectively).
74
Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1481 (2012).
75
Id. (citation omitted).
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to ride that mythic unicorn that is the purely rational man.76
Science shows that the unicorn does not exist and lawyers need to
recognize that reality.
The cognitive science behind the understanding of behavior is
necessary to the study of law because “[l]aws are made by
humans.”77 Professor Kathryn M. Stanchi of Temple University
James E. Beasley School of Law and other scholars recognize that
understanding cognitive processes is important to all lawyers and,
specifically, legal writers. Stanchi declares that “the art of
persuasion requires empathy as well as a deep understanding of
human psychology and the complex emotional and intellectual
processes that result in perception and attitude change.”78 She is
right. To do their job, lawyers need to understand how people think
both rationally and irrationally, and how people change their
minds both predictably and unpredictably.79
While lawyers are beginning to take note, this contemporary
discussion of cognitive bias and the law was foreshadowed eighty
years ago by Judge Jerome Frank, who introduced the idea of
sociological jurisprudence,80 now called Behavioral Decision
Theory.81 Recently, there has been a move to augment the law-and76

See Deborah J. Merritt, Legal Education in the Age of Cognitive Science
and Advance Classroom Technology, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 39, 41 (2008)
(“Despite significant advances in the science of learning, law professors today
teach much as their own professors did a generation ago. Legal scholars and
lawyers know surprisingly little about the cognitive science research that has
unveiled new methods of harnessing the brain to work harder and smarter. The
legal profession depends upon rigorous thinking, creative problem solving, and
persuasive advocacy for success. Yet, law faculties have remained strangely
oblivious to research about how the brain works.”).
77
Terrance Chorvat et al., Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 35, 35 (2005).
78
Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 411, 412.
79
Even Judge Marsha Berzon recognizes “[b]ecause our cognitive
resources are limited, we often use heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to solve
complex problems. These shortcuts, while useful in allowing us efficiently to
approximate solutions to difficult problems, sometimes result in errors.
Importantly, these flaws are not random. Rather, humans err in consistent,
predictable ways.” Berzon, supra note 74, at 1481–82.
80
See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
81
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
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economics movement, embraced for the last thirty years,82 with a
law-and-behavioral-science approach. This approach draws on
cognitive science, sociology, and other behavioral sciences rather
than relies on the rational decision maker.83 A host of
psychological factors “influence individual judgment and choices,”
including “beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and social forces, along
with purely cognitive processes.”84 While lawyers and judges try to
take account of, and discount for, these factors—at least the ones
of which they are aware—the cognitive bias aspect of “Purely
cognitive processes,”85 often escapes attention.
The “invisible hand of cognitive bias”86 takes many forms and
refers to making decisions in ways that systematically depart from
rational choice.87 One example of cognitive biases studied is the
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499,
1501 (1998). See also BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinkski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to
Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000).
82
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed.
2010); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudwijn Bockaert & Gerrit De
Geest eds., 1999); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 10 (3d ed. 2003).
83
See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (asserting that human behavior is
better understood through behavioral and sociocultural theories than the rational
choice theory).
84
Langevoort, supra note 81, at 1503.
85
Id.
86
Marybeth Herald, Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias, and
Dress Codes, 41 U.S.F.L. REV. 299, 303 n.24 (2007). It is important to point out
that although the existence of a systemic cognitive bias is a departure from pure
rationality, as philosophers like Jon Elster and legal scholars Jules Coleman and
Robert Scott have noted, “Identifying a departure from rationality is not the
same as discovering irrationality.” Langevoort, supra note 81, at 1506; see also
JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY
(1985). Cognitive biases may be adaptive (beneficial) for most people most of
the time. Just because cognitive biases may not be based in reason, it does not
mean that they are necessarily bad. Bad or good, the point is that they need to be
recognized for what they are and taken into account in advocating a client’s
position as well as in administering justice.
87
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 83, at 1076–1102 (exploring cognitive
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human genetic predisposition to react to and interact with stories.88
Legal scholars point out that “[s]torytelling really is part of general
lawyering skills, just as much as legal analysis, logic, and
argumentation,”89 and it is important in every aspect of the practice
of law.90 Legal scholars have also focused on another type of
cognitive bias called “framing theory,” which posits that humans
have a stronger disposition to avoid loss rather than attain gain.91
This bias is why we are more likely to agree to undergo a medical
bias in common decision-making tasks, such as playing a game of chess or
choosing health care insurance providers).
88
See generally JOSEPH CARROLL, READING HUMAN NATURE: LITERARY
DARWINISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2011); JONATHAN GOTTSCHALL,
LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND A NEW HUMANITIES (2008).
89
Legal Storytelling is an Innovative Approach to Law Education at
Rutgers-Camden, RUTGERS TODAY (Aug. 18, 2011), http://news.rutgers.edu/
medrel/news-releases/2011/08/legal-storytelling-a-20110818. See also JAMES
BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAW (1985); Brian J. Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for
Lawyers on How to Use Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Fact
Sections, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 459, 465 (2001); James Boyd White, What Can a
Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014, 2021 (1989)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION (1988)).
90
See, e.g., Kenneth D. Chestek, The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL
WRITING 127 (2008); Bret A. Rappaport, Tapping the Human Adaptive Origins
of Storytelling by Requiring Legal Writing Students to Read a Novel In Order to
Appreciate How Character, Setting, Plot, Theme, and Tone (CSPTT) are as
Important as IRAC, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 268 (2008); Donna M. Steslow &
Carolyn Gardner, More than One Way to Tell a Story: Integrating Storytelling
into Your Law Course, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 249 (2011).
91
See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 166–67 (2000) [hereinafter Guthrie, Framing
Frivolous Litigation]; Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the
Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1117–19 (2003) [hereinafter Guthrie, Prospect
Theory]; see also Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co., 873 F.2d 465, 470 (1st Cir. 1989)
(using framing theory to analyze jury’s finding of proximate cause). The
adaptive basis for the aversion to loss is that we do not perish from passing up a
positive choice, but a wrong step could spell doom. We are, therefore, predisposed, biased, to avoid loss rather than seek gain. See generally Todd
McElroy & John J. Seta, Framing the Frame: How Task Goals Determine the
Likelihood and Direction of Framing Effects, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING
251 (2007); Kahneman & Tversky, Heuristics and Biases, supra note 57;
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 57.
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procedure with a ninety percent chance of success than the same
procedure when it carries a ten percent mortality rate.92 Another
bias called “temporal discounting” is the phenomenon in which we
privilege the present and discount the future.93 In other words, we
want things now.94 For example, most people choose $100 today in
place of $120 a month from now.95 There is also hindsight bias—
when looking back, humans tend to overestimate the likelihood
that they could have anticipated a future event.96 The “brain bug”97
of hindsight bias has been explored by examining the manner by
which bankruptcy judges go about finding fraudulent conveyances
in the cases presented to them.98 With this background in mind,
this Article now turns to genre bias, one of the many cognitive
biases that operate within the legal writing context.
IV. GENRE IS A COGNITIVE BIAS
Cognitive biases, and by extension genre bias, are an innate
part of human psychology.99 In our ancestral past, biases were
mainly adaptive (i.e., advantageous to survival or reproduction).
92

KAHNEMAN, supra note 52, at 88.
BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 100; Thomas S. Critchfield & Scott H.
Kollins, Temporal Discounting: Basic Research and the Analysis of Socially
Important Behavior, 34 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 101, 102 (2001).
94
See Bret A. Rappaport, A Shot Across the Bow: How to Write an
Effective Demand Letter, 5 J. ALWD 32, 40–41 (2008) (“People want things
now, even when waiting for the payout will actually result in a greater benefit.”).
95
BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 99–102.
96
See Guthrie, Prospect Theory, supra note 91, at 1499, 1504; see also
Jennifer Bonds-Raacke et al., Hindsight Bias Demonstrated in the Prediction of
Sporting Event, 141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 349 (2001).
97
Psychology professor Dean Buonomano of the University of California
at Los Angeles refers to “brain bugs” as subtle biases, illusions, and irrationality
that affect our decision-making abilities. See BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 1–
3.
98
Michael Simkovic & Benjamin Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout
Bankruptcies, the Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap
Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 151–55 (2010) (“Several studies set in
a context resembling the circumstances of bankruptcy judges in fraudulent
transfer cases against [leveraged buyout bankruptcy] lenders have found
evidence of hindsight bias.”).
99
See BUONOMANO, supra note 53, at 1–5.
93
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While some biases remain adaptive,100 many biases are now
maladaptive. This is due to the disconnection between our
evolutionary environment and our modern world—legal101 and
otherwise.102 Given what literary scholars say about genre and
what researchers in the scientific community say about cognitive
bias, genre should be considered a kind of cognitive bias.
A comprehensive explanation of the claim that genre is an
innate adaptive trait would be beyond this Article’s scope. In fact,
the social science world is already fully engulfed in the broader
endeavor of determining whether certain behaviors are the product
of nature (adaptive) or the product of culture.103 Entire books have
been devoted to the subject of whether behaviors like art and music
are innate and adaptive traits.104 This Article, instead, focuses on
exposing the logical existence of genre bias by exploring genre
literature and through detailing the empirical evidence.
First, however, it is important to understand how the human
mind works and has evolved. The human mind is an “intricate,
evolved machine that has allowed humans to inhabit”105 this
complex, ever-changing world. In this complex world, humans
must survive, thrive, and reproduce. The brain effectively solves a
100

See Robert A. Cummins & Helen Nistico, Maintaining Life Satisfaction:
The Role of Positive Cognitive Bias, 3 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 37 (2002); Martie G.
Haselton et al., Adaptive Rationality: An Evolutionary Perspective On Cognitive
Bias, 27 SOC. COGNITION 732 (2009) (summarizing dozens of positive cognitive
biases).
101
See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995) (asserting that traditional overt discrimination has
given way to subtle intergroup bias stemming from stereotypes and other
cognitive distortions); Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go
Bad: Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making,
9 CLINICAL L. REV. 731, 745–46 (2003).
102
See, e.g., Aaron T. Beck, Cognitive Models of Depression, 1 J.
COGNITIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY 5 (1987) (describing depression as a consequence
of cognitive biases).
103
See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN
DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE (2003); EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE
UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998).
104
See, e.g., DENIS DUTTON, THE ART INSTINCT: BEAUTY, PLEASURE, AND
HUMAN EVOLUTION (2010).
105
Haselton et al., supra note 100, at 733.
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host of problems through “large-scale cooperation, social
exchange, habitat formation, agriculture, and cumulative
culture.”106 While Evolution is the ultimate determiner of our
species’ physical characteristics107 many have questioned whether
Evolution predisposes and guides behavior as well.108 The
determination that a given behavior is or is not an adaptive product
of biological evolution is not made under a microscope and
behaviors do not fossilize. However, this that does not mean we
cannot explore a variety of factors to determine if a given behavior
is an aspect of universal human psychology, and therefore, a likely
product of evolution. With greater frequency, scholars are
highlighting an array of human behaviors—such as art,109
storytelling,110 music,111 and even rhetoric112—that are likely
106

Id.
Evolution, called descent with modification, is simply the species-based
law of adapt and procreate—or perish. See generally Evolution 101, Descent
with Modification, UNIV. OF CAL. – BERKELEY, http://evolution.berkeley.edu/
evosite/evo101/IIIADescent.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). Genetic drift and
natural selection drive evolution. Genetic drift is the random alteration of
inherited traits (in the form of gene alleles) from ancestor to descendent. Some
mutations are positive, called adaptive, and some are negative, called
maladaptive. Natural selection is the interaction of members of a population
with their ecosystem such that those individuals with the traits better adapted to
the environment will survive longer and have more reproductive success. These
fertile adapters pass on those favored traits to their descendants. Those
organisms not as well adapted to survive and procreate have fewer or no
descendants. Over generations, those organisms possessing adaptive traits
succeed. Those without such trait(s) fail. See generally DANIEL C. DENNET,
DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 39–42
(1996).
108
See generally ALAS, POOR DARWIN: ARGUMENTS AGAINST
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (Hilary Rose and Steven Rose eds., 2000).
109
See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 104.
110
See BRYAN BOYD, ON THE ORIGIN OF STORIES: EVOLUTION, COGNITION,
AND FICTION (repr. 2010); JOSEPH CARROLL, LITERARY DARWINISM:
EVOLUTION, HUMAN NATURE, AND LITERATURE (2004); JOSEPH CARROLL,
READING HUMAN NATURE: LITERARY DARWINISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2011).
111
See Steven Brown, The “Musilanguage” Model of Music Evolution, in
THE ORIGINS OF MUSIC 271, 296 (Nils L. Wallin et al. eds., 2001). See also
Ellen Dissanayake, Antecedents of the Temporal Arts in Early Mother-Infant
Interaction, in THE ORIGINS OF MUSIC 389, 391–405 (Nils L. Wallin et al. eds.,
107
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adaptive, and genre should be added to that list.
There are a number of key areas of inquiry for determining
whether an aspect of behavior is adaptive. These include whether
there is the cross-cultural presence of the trait, how far back in
human history the trait can be found, and whether the trait
bestowed some evolutionary advantage on early humans.113 Based
on these factors, some have argued that art114 and stories115 are
adaptive. But the most telling evidence that a behavior may well be
the product of evolution is the fact that the trait is practiced
everywhere—the so-called “human universals.”116
Universals are “those (empirically determined) features of
culture, society, language, and psyche found in all
ethnographically or historically recorded human societies.”117
Human universals are not features of anatomy like eyes, but rather
are products of the mind.118 In a broader context view, “the human
common sense view of the world” is a universal.119 Some of the
hundreds of human universals120 include tools and tool-making,
myths, legends, fear of snakes, proverbs, sex roles, music, kinship
systems, grammar, marriage, personal names, and so on. Since the
traits are universal between different areas and cultures, “it is
plausible that these traits have a biological basis and that they are

2001).

112

See Bret A. Rappaport, Darwinian Ceremonies: Is the Rhetoric of
Praise and Blame Adaptive?, 2 EVOLUTIONARY REV. 151 (2011).
113
See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 104, at 84.
114
See, e.g., id.
115
See, e.g., BOYD, supra note 110.
116
Donald E. Brown, Human Universals and Their Implications,
in BEING HUMANS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL UNIVERSALITY AND PARTICULARITY IN
TRANSDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 156, 156 (Neil Roughley ed., 2000).
117
Id. at 156.
118
Id. at 157.
119
EDWARD G. SLINGERLAND, WHAT SCIENCE OFFERS THE HUMANITIES:
INTEGRATING BODY AND CULTURE 139 (2008) (“It is the existence and
interaction . . . that gives rise to the human ‘commonsense’ view of the world,
which remains quite robustly universal despite the vagaries of cultural
variation.”).
120
Donald E. Brown provides a list of Human Universals in STEVEN
PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE 434–39 (2002).
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evolved features of a universal human nature.”121 Universals
commonly arise because they are “good tricks”—forced solutions
to recurring situations.122 Genres are such a “good trick,” and while
[n]o one would defend the idea that there is a “heroslays-dragon-and-wins-hand-of-beautiful-maiden”
gene in the human gene pool[,] . . . given that there
is a nontrivial set of innate human desires and
capacities, and the fact that the world in which
humans operate has had a fairly stable structure for
at least the past several millennia, it is not surprising
that tales of evil stepmothers or brave underdog
heroes will arise universally and have universal
appeal.123
Similarly, although there is no “genre” gene, any more than
there is a “hero-slays-dragon-and-wins-hand-of-beautiful-maiden”
gene, genre is a human universal. Genre is just like art, music,
marriage, personal names, and the rest.124 Genre, as a functional
way to categorize and think, transcends cultures and environments.
Recognized for at least 2,500 years,125 genre bestows a host of
advantages on humans. For example, genre allows humans to
process information more quickly.126 A host of studies attest to the
121

Elizabeth Cashdan, What is a Human Universal? Human Behavioral
Ecology and Human Nature, in ARGUING ABOUT HUMAN NATURE:
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 71, 71 (Stephen M. Downes & Edouard Machery
eds., 2013). There remains some debate as to “true universals” versus
“conditional universals.” Donald E. Brown, Human Universals, Human Nature,
And Human Culture, 133 DAEDALUS 47–54 (2004). The former apply to all
humans while the latter are selected for. Brown, who cites only to true
universals, undervalues human innateness, argues Haidt. See JONATHAN HAIDT,
THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND
RELIGION 130–32 (2013).
122
HAIDT, supra note 121, at 139 (citing DENNET, supra note 107, at 486).
123
SLINGERLAND, supra note 119, at 140–41.
124
See Miller, supra note 27, at 161–62 (citing KENNETH BURKE, A
GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 103–04 (1969)).
125
Plato divided literature into three genres: poetry, drama, and prose. See
GERARD GENNETTE, THE ARCHITEXT: AN INTRODUCTION 6 (Jane E. Lewin
trans., 1992).
126
See Gary M. Olson et al., Cognitive Aspects of Genre, 10 POETIC 283
(1981). See also Karl F. Haberlandt & Arthur C. Graesser, Component
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effect genre has on comprehension,127 recall, and memory.128 In
fact, genre manifests itself in children as early as pre-school age,129
and “[u]nderstanding the effect of genre on reading could lead to
more efficient teaching strategies and interventions in schools.”130
A recent study of medical students for whom English was a second
language points in a similar direction.131 The researchers
concluded that there may be pedagogical value in “sensitizing
students to rhetorical effects and to rhetorical structure that recur in
genre-specific texts, to activate and develop schemata, to have
learners schematize and/or criticize different textual structures and
provide prototypical examples of scientific rhetoric.”132
In addition to the inferential evidence, neuroscience has studied
Processes in Text Comprehension and Some of Their Interactions, 114 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 357 (1985) (showing the relationship between
categorization and the ability to process information); K.M. Zabrucky & D.
Moore, Influence of Text Genre on Adults’ Monitoring of Understanding and
Recall, 25 EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 691 (1999) (discussing memory management
processes in older adults).
127
See, e.g., Olson et al., supra note 126; Charles A. Weaver & Deborah S.
Bryant, Monitoring of Comprehension: The Role of Text Difficulty in
Metamemory for Narrative and Expository Text, 23 MEMORY & COGNITION 12
(1995).
128
See Arthur C. Graesser et al., Advanced Outlines, Familiarity, and Text
Genre on Retention of Prose, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 281 (reporting
findings that narrative passages were better recalled than were expository
passages); Michael B. W. Wolfe, Memory for Narrative and Expository Text:
Independent Influences of Semantic Associations and Text Organization 31 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 359 (2005).
129
Ruth A. Berman & Bracha Nir-Sagiv, Comparing Narrative and
Expository Text Construction Across Adolescence: A Developmental Paradox,
43 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 79, 104–05 (2007).
130
Amy Kurivchack Landers, An Examination of Genre Differences 3
(Aug. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file
with author).
131
Francoise Salager-Meyer, Reading Expository Prose at the PostSecondary Level: The Influence of Textual Variable on L2 Reading
Comprehension (A Genre-based Approach), 8 READING FOREIGN LANGUAGE
645, 660 (1991) (citing Piedad Fernandez Toledo, Genre Analysis and Reading
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how genre actually functions in the brain,133 further indicating the
existence of genre bias. In a series of articles on what he calls
“cognitive category theory,” and what this Article calls “genre
bias,” Professor Michael Sinding summarizes the landscape.134 The
classic view of cognition is that concepts are first mentally
processed definitions, where each object is either included in or
excluded from a category, and between members of a category
there are no distinctions.135 This is the essence of the ancient view
of genre, and it is simplistic and mistaken. The more proper
cognitive model for the recognition and operation of genre
involves the interplay between Schema Theory, Prototype Theory,
and its cousin—the Exemplar Theory.
Schema Theory postulates that all knowledge is organized into
units or categories.136 Many scholars have observed that schemata
“guide the production and comprehension of both content and
forms of text.”137 “We make sense of our new experiences by
placing them into categories . . . [and] these mental blueprints
provide both shortcuts and stereotypes.”138 As sets of related
elements, genre schemas “organize knowledge about related . . .

133

See generally MARK TURNER, READING MINDS: THE STUDY OF ENGLISH
IN THE AGE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 150 (1991).
134

Michael Sinding, “A Sermon in the Midst of a Smutty Tale:” Blending in
Genres of Speech, Writing and Literature, in COGNITIVE LITERARY STUDIES:
CURRENT THEMES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 145, 157 & n.1 (Isabel Jean & Julien
Jacques Simon eds., 2012) [hereinafter Sinding, A Sermon in the Midst];
Sinding, After Definitions, supra note 2 at 184–85, 214–15; Michael Sinding,
Blending in a Baciyelmo: Don Quixote’s Genre Blending and the Invention of
the Novel, in BLENDING AND THE STUDY OF NARRATIVE 147 (Ralf Schneider &
Marcus Hartner eds., 2012); Michael Sinding, Framing Monsters: Multiple and
Mixed Genres, Cognitive Category Theory, and Gravity’s Rainbow, 31 POETICS
TODAY 465, 467 (2010) [hereinafter Sinding, Framing Monsters].
135
Sinding, Framing Monsters, supra note 134, at 474.
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See generally RUMELHART, supra note 48.
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Chen, supra note 44, at 27; see also GIBBONS, supra note 17, at 11; JEAN
MATTER MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA
THEORY (1984) (discussing how schemata inform one’s understanding of
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texts.”139 In this way, genre functions as a “sense of the whole by
which we may understand all of the parts.”140 Professor Sinding
expressly argues that “much is gained when we regard genres as
schemas.”141 Specifically, he explains that genres are
“constellations of features at multiple levels” and proposes a model
for genres of all kinds.142 In order from highest level to lowest
level, his “genre generic space” looks like this:
 Sociocognitive Action Frame: occasion,
communicative purpose, social action context
(including other genres)


Rhetorical Situation Frame: setting, speaker,
audience, medium

Discourse Structure Frame:
1) Extraliterary: sequence of discourse
elements and relations (moves and
steps), including form, speech act type,
style, etc.
2) Literary (Fiction): narrative (fictional
rhetorical situation, story world with
settings, characters, actions), narration
(order of narration, form, style, etc.)143
Sinding explains that each “frame” is embedded in the higher
order frame, although they are nevertheless distinct. In the
sociocognitive frame, the action is performed to “achieve a
purpose on an occasion, with a certain rhetorical situation,” and in
the intermediary frame, the writer or speaker communicates to an
audience “using a certain discourse structure.”144 Sinding’s above
tripartite model offers an excellent means by which to look at legal
genres as nested schemas. Like Russian dolls, the outermost
generic frame (Sociocognitive Action) is “thinking like a lawyer,”


139
140

(1967)).
141
142
143
144

Sinding, After Definitions, supra note 2, at 195 (citation omitted).
Id. at 196 (citing E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 71–89
Id.
Id.
Id. at 196–97.
Id. at 197.
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the type of law—patent, divorce, criminal, etc.—is the middle doll
(Rhetorical Situation), and the most specific genre, being the actual
documents, such as application, divorce decree, or jury waiver
(Discourse Structure).
Developed by Dr. Eleanor Rosch and other researchers in the
early 1970s, Prototype Theory postulates that people categorize
items and concepts based on an idealized, or average, idealized
representation of that category.145 A good example is a dog.146
When discussing dogs, people often think of collies or retrievers,
because such pooches represent the ideal prototype as opposed to
pugs or Pomeranians.147 The Exemplar Theory is a cousin to
Prototype Theory because they both employ a model.148 While the
prototype view says that “we learn a summary representation of the
whole category and classify by comparing the new items to the
prototype,” the “exemplar view explains says that people
categorize by learning and using specific remembered
examples”149 known as a “paragon.”150 Within genre theory, a
paragon becomes the model for others to emulate.151 Babe Ruth,
Willie Mays, and Sandy Koufax are examples of baseball
paragons.152 A paragon of the trial lawyer might be Clarence
145

See BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 38–39; see also SWALES,
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Semantic Categories, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. GEN. 192, 224–26
(1975); Eleanor H. Rosch, Natural Categories, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 328
(1973).
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OF THE MIND (4th ed. 2009); Kirsten Abbot-Smith & Michael Tomasello,
Exemplar-Learning and Schematization in a Usage-Based Account of Syntactic
Acquisition, 23 LINGUISTIC REV. 275 (2006); Douglas Hintzman, “Schema
Abstraction” in a Multiple-Trace Memory Model, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 328
(1986).
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See Sinding, Framing Monsters, supra note 134, at 480.
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Id. at 493.
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in CONCEPT AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT: ECOLOGICAL AND
INTELLECTUAL FACTORS IN CATEGORIZATION 79 (Ulric Neisse ed., 1987)).
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Darrow, and to a law student, a paragon contract might be the one
he or she first studied in law school. Form books, often based on
documents validated in court opinions, are examples of paragon
documents.
This is not just all theory. Because scientists can now see and
measure brain activity in response to defined stimuli, neural
imaging and cognitive science have also uncovered the neural
substrates and networks that play key roles in categories of both
knowledge and prototype thinking.153 As Indiana University
Associate Professor of Spanish & French World Languages Julien
Simon concludes, “[G]enres are an integral part of cognition . . .
[w]e naturally cluster the information picked up from our
environment . . . .”154
Finally, although by a different name, the existence of a genre
bias has been directly explored by scholars. For example, in 1999,
researchers examined whether the labeling of certain lyrics without
accompanying music as “rap,” “heavy metal,” “pop,” or “country”
would influence a reader’s interpretation of lyrics as pro-social or
antisocial.155 The lyrics labeled as “rap” or “heavy metal” led
participants to conclude that those songs were less likely to inspire
pro-social behavior than when those same lyrics were labeled
“pop” or “country.”156 Similar studies outside the realm of music
genre research reveal how a reader’s comprehension is
influenced—or biased—by labeling a given text as one genre or
another. In one study, researchers established that calling a given
153

See generally Alexander G. Huth et al., A Continuous Semantic Space
Describes the Representation of Thousands of Object and Action Categories
Across the Human Brain, 76 NEURON 1210 (2012); Mark L. Johnson, Mind,
Metaphor, Law, 59 MERCER L. REV. 845, 848–56 (2007); Paul J. Reber et al.,
Dissociating Explicit and Implicit Category Knowledge with fMRI, 15
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 574–83 (2006); Simon, Rational Choice, supra note
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LANGUAGE ON BRAIN CIRCUITS OF WORDS AND SERIAL ORDER (2002)).
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Julien Simon, A Neurocognitive Study of Literary Genres: The Case of
the Novela Dialogada 9 (Dec. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Purdue University) [hereinafter Simon Ph.D. Thesis], available at
http://search.proquest.com/docview/305265351.
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See Mary E. Ballard et al., Genre of Music and Lyrical Content:
Expectation Effects, 160 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 476, 477 (1999).
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text either “a literary story” or “a news story” greatly impacted the
reader’s comprehension.157 Specifically, subjects reading the text
as “literature” experienced longer reading times, better memory of
surface information, and poorer memory of situational information
as compared to those who read the same text under a “news”
label.158 Researchers suggest that “information about text genre
triggers strategic processes in reading [and that] in most
naturalistic situations, people read texts belonging to a particular
genre, and they adhere (consciously or subconsciously) to the
constraints of that genre.”159
Indeed, new biases are “discovered” regularly. Following on
Simon’s work, now is as good a time as any to discover genre
bias—a cognitive bias hiding in plain sight. The published list160 of
cognitive biases includes biases whose definitions overlap and
others that work in unison or are part of suites of biases. However,
genre bias has never before been recognized on a published list. It
should be. Regardless of what it is called, ultimately genre bias
helps create a reality by constraining writers’ choices and
channeling readers’ expectations. French philosopher Jacques
Derrida famously said that “[t]here is no genreless text.”161 And
certainly, genre bias applies to every aspect of writing, including
legal writing. Lawyers need to understand how genre shapes the
perception of what they read and how it shapes the opinions and
judgments derived from those readings.
V. GENRE BIAS IN LEGAL WRITING
A. New Rhetoric – A Road to Genre Bias in Legal Studies
To co-opt Derrida—there is no genreless legal text. This is true
157
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Oct. 19, 2013).
161
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for legal reading and writing.162 Consequently, honoring the genre
in legal writing by remaining true to its strictures bestows a
positive cognitive bias, while breaking the genre is
disadvantageous. Either way, genre bias skews rational thought, a
fact of which lawyers must be aware and must be wary.
Stanchi points the way forward path, observing that
“[a]dvocacy is most effective when the lawyer has the tools to
make deliberate, conscious decisions about the persuasive device
to employ and how . . . to employ it.”163 But traditionally, legal
writing has been viewed as a “technical exercise in graphics”—the
mere representation of thought in symbols.164 However, this is
backwards. John Marshall Law School Professor Joel R. Cornwell
explains that “writing is the interplay of images that we call
thinking, a processing of data into symbols that compel other
symbols.”165 He continues: “Thought presupposes imagery because
there is otherwise nothing to think . . . so writing is thought in its
purest form.”166 This does not mean that writing is “necessary” for
thought, or that the human mind is a “blank slate” upon which
culture writes views of truth through symbols.167 Rather, writing is
the interplay between the body, the brain, and the outside world
and is represented by symbols which help us interpret the world.168
162

Cf. Christine M. Venter, Analyze This: Using Taxonomies to “Scaffold”
Students’ Legal Thinking and Writing Skills, 57 MERCER L. REV. 621, 632
(2006) (“[R]eading is a way of constructing knowledge, and proficient readers
actually make meaning by and through their interactions with the text.
According to the New Rhetoric, what a reader understands and retains from the
text and context depends upon the reader’s prior knowledge of similar texts and
contexts”) (footnote omitted).
163
Stanchi, supra note 78, at 413.
164
Joel R. Cornwell, Legal Writing as a Kind of Philosophy, 48 MERCER L.
REV. 1091, 1094 (1997).
165
Id.
166
Id. at 1094–95.
167
See generally PINKER, supra note 103 (discussing the history of the
view of the human mind as a blank slate and the modern view challenging that
view).
168
This holistic view of how we do this is called “embodied cognition”
which “contends that cognitive processes develop when a tightly coupled system
emerges from real-time, goal-directed interactions between organisms and their
environment; the nature of these interactions influences the formation and

A LAWYER’S HIDDEN PERSUADER

227

Writing, as a sign system, is a major component of the process of
making meaning.169
The idea of writing as thought is an established one within
the humanities.170 But only now is the important consequence of
writing and thought as “making meaning” generating inroads into
the legal writing world. It is doing so under the moniker “New
Rhetoric.” As University of Nevada Law School Professor Linda
L. Berger points out, “[i]n the New Rhetoric, writing is a process
for creating knowledge, not merely a means for communicating
it.”171 In New Rhetoric, genres are situated in the communities
that give rise to them, where the specific genre is a “negotiable
‘social fact’ rather than an invariable set of conventions.”172 A
good example of this is the genre of college writing and how
students are constrained by the fact that they write for instructors
further specifies the nature of the developing cognitive capacities.” Embodied
Cognition, IEP, http://www.iep.utm.edu/embodcog/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013);
see also Gerald M. Edelman, The Embodiment of the Mind, 135 DAEDALUS 23–
32 (2006); SLINGERLAND, supra note 119, at 9–14.
169
For a discussion of “meaning making,” see supra note 2 and
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with pen and paper is more effective for learning then a computer. Specifically,
writing sends feedback signals to the brain and leaves a “motor memory,” which
later makes it easier to recall the information connected with the actually
physical movement. See Gulnaz Saiyed, Writing By Hand Better for Learning,
Study Shows, MEDILL REPORTS CHI. (Jan. 27, 2011), http://news.medill.
northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=177291. The study is also discussed in
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EDUC. LEADERSHIP 82 (2012).
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who are trained to read compositions in a certain way.173
Within the New Rhetoric paradigm, some contend that this
knowledge-shaping174 is primarily within the individual,175 while
others contend this knowledge construction takes place within a
social context.176 So-called inner-directed New Rhetoricians “seek
to discover writing processes that are so fundamental as to be
universal,” while so-called outer-directed New Rhetoricians
believe thinking and language are each “a social construction.”177
Both are correct. The idea of “making meaning” through writing is
both cognitively and socially constructed,178 and this duality is
evidenced in the concept of genre.179 Interestingly, while law
reviews summarize the large body of non-legal scholarship that
attests to genre’s influence in constraining writers and influencing
readers and the resulting process of understanding the world,180 the
legal writing academy lacks such genre scholarship of its own texts
and ignores the importance of genre bias in legal writing
altogether.181 One aim of this Article is to initiate such study so
173
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that legal writers can be more effective writers.
Persuasion, the essence of legal writing, is intimately
intertwined with the nature of the specific audience. So is genre.182
In certain professions, such as the law, this intersection of genre
and persuasion is particularly important because “persuasion . . .
finds its realization through various genres.”183 Genre study
examines (1) the persuasive functions of the text, particularly
formal features; (2) the practices surrounding the document; and
(3) the language employed.184 Additionally, the study of genre
considers the broader social action “performed by adhering to or
resisting these formal features, analyzing the relationship between
features and rhetorical action—the action that texts are employed
to accomplish.”185 This idea of rhetorical action being employed to
accomplish a goal is true in legal writing.
Lawyers may have a passive and unarticulated appreciation of
genre bias but this is not enough. Lawyers must understand that
genre bias enhances comprehension and creates meaning, thereby
simultaneously constraining choices for writers and forcing texts
into a set mold which controls readers’ perceptions and reception
of that text. Such is the yin and yang of genre. It needs to be
central in the mind of the lawyer when she writes. As more
specifically argued below, genre is a cognitive bias that matters to
lawyers because (1) genre is a natural part of the human decisionmaking process and law is about decision making; and (2) genre is
(asserting that law is a genre of rhetoric), and several other sources that examine
the broader notion of rhetoric and law. Karen J. Sneddon, In the Name of God,
Amen: Language in Last Wills and Testaments, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 665, 674
n.51 (2011) [hereinafter Sneddon, In the Name of God]. In arguing that law
schools should embrace writing across the curriculum, Professor Parker brushes
on the topic of genre in a section entitled “Writing Skills as ‘Tools of the
Trade,’” but only in a footnote. Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the
Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need it and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV.
561, 580 n.73 (2004).
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an essential ingredient in transactional documents and a vital part
of every aspect of every brief, opinion, or other type of persuasive
legal writing.186 However, before delving into the specifics of legal
writing genres, it is important to explore how, in general,
professions internalize and perpetuate genres.
B. Professional Genres, Ceremonials, and Uptake: The Making
of a Lawyer
Semotician Tzvetan Todorov observed that “[i]n a [given]
society, the recurrence of certain discursive properties is
institutionalized, and individual texts are produced and perceived
in relation to the norm constituted by this codification. A genre,
whether literary or not, is nothing but this codification of
discursive properties.”187 These discursive properties are the
components of genre, and the normative process described by
Todorov occurs in all professions. Such professional genres are
like Russian Nesting Dolls188 with smaller sub-genres found within
larger ones. This pattern is evident in all professional genres, from
accountants to zoologists, and lawyers are no different.189 Lawyers
create legal arguments and documents within “the parameters of
accepted formats,”190 and so genre analysis should be (and is)
implicit in legal writing textbooks.191 However, law school legal
writing programs don’t engage in genre analysis192 even though
186
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genres are right there, hiding in the reeds.
For example, Professor Robert N. Cook’s Legal Drafting,
published in 1951, was the first textbook on legal writing, and
offers 900 (now frail and yellowed) pages of specific forms of
legal writing but never mentions the term “genre.”193 Cook does,
however, offer a prescient note about the centrality of what this
Article calls “genre bias.” Cook states in his Rule 23 that as “the
whole is, in the art of legal composition, antecedent to the parts,”
going on to explain that:
This is a rule of importance in some other kinds of
composition occasionally, but of special and
invariable importance in legal composition.The
draftsman should always and firmly grasp the whole
law, deed, or pleading he is to draw, before he
commences to draw any part. This may be done by
skilled persons tacitly and almost unconsciously, as
mental arithmetic by a skilled calculator.194
In other words, genre bias operates in legal writing.
A decade later, Professor Reed Dickerson provided a classic
definition of legal writing that implied the importance of genre. He
said that “[l]egal drafting is the crystallization and expression in
definitive form of a legal right, privilege, function, duty [or]
status. . . .”195 More recently, in a book for international students
studying American law, Professor Jill J. Ramsfield notes that legal
writing genres “function in specifically designed settings,” and she
offers an entire chapter on various legal sub-genres.196 In a
delightful book analogizing the law to architecture as a legal writer
is both artist and engineer, Ramsfield sets out the “situational
elements” of legal writing as including “traditions” which lawyers
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are “expected to honor.”197 Zeroing in on genre bias, without using
the term, Ramsfield declares that “[i]n each writing situation, you
may be expected to exercise certain analytical choices derived
from forms or patterns developed within the legal community. You
learn these methods in law school, but your repertoire continues
the increase afterward.”198
In 2004, University of Wyoming College of Law Professor
Michael R. Smith authored a comprehensive law review treatment
of legal writing genres, addressing genre as taxonomy rather than
from a rhetorical or socio-cognitive perspective.199 Smith identifies
the categories of legal writing as (1) analysis writing, (2) legal
drafting, and (3) critical analysis writing.200 Although Smith does
not engage in genre analysis, his listing of these different genres of
legal writing, and cataloging their application, is important to the
study of genres as a cognitive bias in legal writing by cataloging
their application. Without explicitly calling it genre bias, law
professors Cook, Dickerson, Ramsfield and Smith each begin to
point the path towards appreciation of the centrality of genre bias
in legal writing.
However, beyond the law school gate and across the
metaphorical quad into the actual world lies a well-marked path of
legal writing genre scholarship.201 According to one summary
article, “[t]he legal genre, which has a well-established status in
[Language for Specific Purposes] and sublanguage studies,
includes a variety of texts and situational patterns.”202 Language
for a specific purpose is simply language and culture study in
197
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specific disciplines, such as medicine, business, law, or other
areas.203 The summary article goes on to note that “[w]ithin the
legal genre, there are ‘internal’ functional sub-genres, such as
statutes, conventions, contracts with their numerous subcategories, wills, case reports, etc., which have received
considerable attention both in theoretical and theoreticaltranslation studies in the recent years.”204 For example, in 2003,
Hong Kong Baptist University English Professor John Gibbons
published a comprehensive analysis of legal language, including an
extensive array of legal genres involved in the court system. 205 He
breaks down appearance genre, case report genre, police interview
genre, guilty pleas genre, and several others, arguing that legal
genres create a primary reality prescribing behavior and
meaning.206 English Professor Vijay K. Bhatia at City University
of Hong Kong has also been particularly interested in genres
within the legal discourse.207 Bhatia defines genre as:
[a] recognizable communicative event characterized
by a set of communicative purpose(s) identified and
mutually understood by the members of the
professional or academic community in which it
regularly occurs. Most often it is highly structured
and conventionalized with constraints on allowable
contributions in terms of their intent, positioning,
form and functional value. These constraints,
however, are often exploited by the expert members
of the discourse community to achieve private
intentions within the framework of socially
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See Helen Basturkmen & Catherine Elder, The Practice of LSP, in THE
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS 672 (A. Davies & C. Elder eds., 2004)
(“LSP is generally used to refer to the teaching and research of language in
relation to the communicative needs of speakers of a second language in facing
a particular workplace, academic, or professional context. In such contexts
language is used for a limited range of communicative events.”).
204
Witczak-Plisiecka, supra note 202, at 182.
205
See GIBBONS, supra note 17.
206
See id. at 130–31.
207
See LEGAL DISCOURSE ACROSS CULTURES AND SYSTEMS (Vijay K.
Bhatia et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter LEGAL DISCOURSE ACROSS CULTURES].
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recognized purpose(s).208
This scholarship also points the path to understanding what a
lawyer is at his or her core. Generations of lawyers have been
taught to “think like a lawyer” and more recently, lawyers have
been trained to “write like a lawyer.”209 This Article contends that
to realize the former, a lawyer must master the latter.210
Genres are forms of situated cognition, since how we think and
how we act or write are related and operate as a feedback loop. In
fact, sociologist Anthony Giddens notes the existence of a
“recursive phenomenon in which, through our social practices, we
reproduce the very social structures that subsequently make our
actions necessary, possible, recognizable, and meaningful, so that
our practices reproduce the very structures that consequently call
for these practices.”211 Legal forms, like any genre element such as
Devitt’s grocery list,212 are no different.213
Nested as systems within systems (previously described as
similar to a set of Russian Nesting Dolls), genres not only interact
in a recursive way in their professional with their constituent
practices, but genres also relate and feedback into larger genre
systems called ceremonials.214 Summarizing the work of Anne
Freadman,215 English professors Anis S. Bawarshi and Mary Jo
Reiff explain how genres are like “games” that take place within
208

BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE, supra note 17, at 13.
See, e.g., John D. Feerick Writing Like a Lawyer, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 381 (1993); Kathleen Elliot Vinson, Improving Legal Writing: A Life-Long
Learning Process and Continuing Professional Challenge, 21 TOURO L. REV.
507 (2005).
210
See Miller, supra note 27; see also Mark K. Osbeck, What is “Good
Legal Writing” and Why Does it Matter?, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 417 (2012).
211
BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 80 (citing ANTHONY GIDDENS,
THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION
(1986)).
212
See DEVITT, supra note 36, at 23–24.
213
See Davis, supra note 38.
214
BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 84 (quoting Anne Freadman,
Anyone for Tennis?, in GENRE AND THE NEW RHETORIC 43, 46 (Aviva Freedman
& Peter Medway eds., 2003)).
215
Id. (citing Freadman, supra note 214, at 43; Anne Freadman, Uptake, in
THE RHETORIC AND IDEOLOGY OF GENRE: STRATEGIES FOR STABILITY AND
CHANGE 39 (Richard M. Coe et al. eds., 2002)).
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these “ceremonials.”216 (Linda Berger calls ceremonials a
“problem-solving performance.”)217 Within those ceremonials,
“genres constitute the rules for play for the exchange of
texts . . . .”218 Conveniently for lawyers, these non-lawyer genre
scholars use the ceremonial of a trial to illustrate their point. A trial
consists of several interrelated genres (jury selection, opening
statement, direct, cross, closing, jury instructions, deliberation, and
reading the verdict). Bawarshi and Reiff explain the operation of
genre:
Each of these moments is a genre, though it may be
occupied by several texts, and each of the texts will
deploy a range of tactics . . . . To understand the
rules of the genre is to know when and where it is
appropriate to do and say certain things, and to
know that to do and say them at inappropriate
places and times is to run the risk of having them
ruled out. To use these rules with skill is to apply
questions of strategy to decisions of timing and the
tactical plan of the rhetoric.219 [W]ithin the rules of
the ceremonial, the various genres play off of each
other in coordinated, consequential ways. And
within the rules of the genre game, every text is a
situated performance in which its speaker or writer
plays off of the typified strategies embodied in the
genre, including the sense of timing and
opportunity.220
To play the game, you need to know the rules, and only an
expert can meaningfully participate in this recursive
phenomenon.221 The ability to know how to negotiate genres, how
to apply genres, and how to turn genre strategies into textual
practices involves something called uptake.222 Uptake is effectively
216

Id.
Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 171, at 164.
218
BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 84.
219
Id. at 85 (quoting Freadman, supra note 214, at 43).
220
Id.
221
See Abner & Kierstead, supra note 44, at 366–69 (summarizing the
difference between novice and expert lawyer cognition).
222
BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 85 (citing Freadman, supra note
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selection. As Freadman explains, uptake “selects, defines or
represents its object . . . . This is the hidden dimension of the long,
ramified, intertextual memory of uptake: the object is taken from a
set of possibilities.”223 In other words, uptake is selection. “What
we choose to take up and how we do so is the result of learned
recognition of significance over time and in a particular context”
that becomes habit.224 Again, think of the simple grocery list and
how its use becomes habit. Cognitively, this “learned recognition
of significance” is a manifestation of the schema and prototype
theories discussed earlier.225 Broadly, it is the epitome of learning
to think and write like a lawyer—it is the meta-genre of the
profession.
Lawyers, like all experts, habitually select among
possibilities—the essence of uptake. Linda Berger discusses uptake
by other terms226 citing cognitive research and noting that “[a]cross
the board, experts show greater use of stored schemas [or, genres]
and self-reflective techniques [or uptake], and they draw on a
broader range of strategies appropriate to their domain.”227 Uptake
or “self-reflective techniques” are processing professional
cognitive chops. “Knowledge of uptake is knowledge of what to
214, at 43).
223
Id. at 86 (citing Freadman, supra note 214, at 43).
224
Id.; see also Ann M. Johns, Genre Awareness for the Novice Academic
Student: An Ongoing Quest, 41 LANGUAGE TEACHING 237, 241 (2008) (“When
we read or write in a genre with which we are familiar, and for which we have a
schema, we instantiate our schema for what typifies that genre, its conventions,
as we read or write, and we use our knowledge of conventions as we produce a
new text. The conventions of a genre can refer to a variety of features: the text
structure, the register, the relationships between the writer and the audience, the
uses of non-linear material (e.g., graphs or charts), the common fonts, and even
the paper type and quality.”).
225
See supra Part IV.
226
Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 171. Professor Berger’s
article pre-dates Freadman’s work on uptake and, therefore, the differing
terminology is understandable. That said Berger’s discussion of New Rhetoric
generally, and her discussion of expert-novice research in particular, fits foursquare into Freadman’s thesis. For that matter, Cook’s Rule 23 implies uptake as
well. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
227
Berger, Applying New Rhetoric, supra note 171, at 164 (alteration in
original).
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take up, how, and when, including how to execute uptakes
strategically and when to resist expected uptakes.”228
Bawarshi and Reiff conclude that “such genre uptake
knowledge is often tacitly acquired, ideologically consequential,
deeply remembered and affective, and quite durable, connected not
only to memories of prior, habitual responses to a genre, but also
memories of prior engagements with other, related genres.”229
Moreover, “genre uptake knowledge is also bound up in memories
of prior experiences, relations with users of the genre, and a sense
of one’s authority within a ceremonial”230—in other words, a
strong cognitive bias. Uptake is the key to legal writing because it
is the process by which we learn to write like tax lawyers, or
divorce lawyers, or patent lawyers and so forth. Indeed uptake, as
the cognitive doorway that leads to genre bias, is central to the
making of an effective legal writer.
C. Genre Bias in Transactional and Persuasive Legal Writing
Stepping back to look broadly at legal writing genres,
legislation has the “status of [a] primary legal genre,”231 the
outermost nested Russian doll. Legislation “forms the basis and
essence of all legal conceptualizations and practices,”232 since the
regulation of human affairs in a democracy is accomplished
primarily through legislation. Legislative text is often characterized
by precise, clear, and unambiguous expressions of certainty in
legislative intent. To accomplish this goal, the legislative legal
writing genre employs a “complex array of qualifications, often
strategically positioned at syntactic points where they are unlikely
to attract any ambiguous or unintended interpretation.”233 These
aspects of legislative legal writing “form the basis of the
underlying cognitive structuring”234 in the legislative sentence.
228

BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 86.
Id.
230
Id.
231
Bhatia, Legal Genres, supra note 16, at 1–2.
232
Id. at 6.
233
Id. at 2.
234
Id. Other aspects of legislative genre that aid in accomplishing the
purpose include nominalizing verbs.
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Cases, the next encased doll, represent a sub-genre in the
system of legal genres because they are derived from legislation.
Here, the “system” of legal genres divides into “enabling genres,”
such as briefs and pleadings, and “target genres,” such as deeds
and contracts or simply “litigation” and “transactional.” In his
taxonomy, Smith describes them as “application analysis writing”
and “legal drafting.”235 Within these legal spaces are the various
specific sub-genres (or more dolls) where each such sub-genre
represents “a typified communicative action invoked in response to
a recurrent situation.”236
A given genre (or sub-genre) that results from, and guides, a
given recurrent situations is characterized by similar form and
substance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology professors
Joanne Yates and Wanda T. Orlikowski have devised a model for
identification and analysis of genres in which they explain that
“form refers to the observable physical and linguistic features of
the communication[s],” such as text-formatting devices (i.e.,
agenda), “communication medium,” and “language or symbol
system.237 Substance238 is the typified response and “refers to
social motives, themes and topics being expressed in the
communication.”239
This concept applies nicely to legal writing. For example,
within the realm of transactional documents, typified responses
235

Smith, supra note 199, at 122–25.
Yates & Orlikowski, supra note 2, at 301 (emphasis added). The
Recurrent situations include the history and nature of the established practices,
social relations, and communication media within the organization.
237
Id. at 302.
238
Id. at 301–02.
239
Id. at 301. Yates and Orlikowski apply this methodology to the memo
genre of internal business correspondence. They examine the history from the
scant use of such memos until the later part of the nineteenth century, when
“manufacturing firms mushroomed,” leading to a need for written internal
communications. Id. at 313. They examine the reasons for the memorandum
over time and form elements including filing systems like vertical files. They
turn to the introduction of email and how it both transformed the genre and was
constrained by it. Genre analysis, they explain, “does not attempt to understand
the practice as an isolated act or outcome, but as communicative action that is
situated in a stream of social practices which shape and are shaped by it.” Id. at
318.
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take the form of, well, forms. Lawyers call these typified responses
to recurrent situations “boilerplate.” Judge Frank Easterbrook
rightly concludes that “phrases become boilerplate when many
parties find that the language serves their ends.” Boilerplate is
ubiquitous in transactional documents. In their recent book on
boilerplate language, Professors Mitu Gulati and Robert E. Scott
focus on the theories that explain the “stickiness of boilerplate”
and echoing Judge Easterbrook, contend that boilerplate sticks for
a host of reasons including familiarity, use by a network, pressure
to avoid novel forms, organizational routine, and what the authors
call “endowment effects.”240 The endowment effect is a cognitive
bias that favors the status quo.241 In other words, typified responses
are such because they are treated as such.
The existence and resilience of boilerplate supports the claim
that genre bias exists and matters. Application of the Yates and
Orlikowski’s Recurrent Situation Yields Genre Defined By Form/
Substance model to legal writing sub-genres reveals not only that
these sub-genres are well-established, but also rounds out the thesis
that genre bias matters and supports the conclusion that lawyers
should not break genre. It is to that application, this Article now
turns.
1. Examples of Transactional Legal Writing Sub-Genre: Patent
Application and Wills
There are drafters and litigators—a dichotomy fostered in law
school classrooms242 and lived out, coast to coast, in boardrooms,
conference rooms, and courtrooms. Although much more of the
practice of law takes place in boardrooms and conference rooms
than in courtrooms,243 law school legal writing programs continue
240

See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF
MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN
(2013). Endowment effects overlap with what is called here genre bias.
241
See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 36 (1988).
242
Celeste M. Hammond, Integrating Doctrine and Skills in First-Year
Courses: A Transactional Attorney’s Perspective, 17 J. LEGAL WRITING INST.
409, 409–13 (2011).
243
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
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to treat transactional legal writing as the forgotten child.244 Not
surprisingly, the same is true with regard to genre analysis of
transactional legal discourses. Few published works discuss the
genre of transactional documents. Indeed, existing scholarship
merely reveals that transactional legal writing demonstrates a
conservative, highly structured set of conventions with a high
proportion of standard formulae favoring archaic expressions,
complex patterns of syntax, specialized terminology, and endless
repetition resistant to change. Transactional legal writing is also a
sub-genre that punishes those who transgress its boundaries.245
While some claim that demanding adherence to the genre is a way
for those in control to monopolize knowledge, linguistic scholars
rightly argue that “the overall purpose of this type of discourse is
to promote clarity and certainty within the professional
community.”246 Turning to two types of transactional document
genres, patent applications, and wills we can explore how these
highly structured, formal genres function in the real legal world.
University of California at Santa Barbara Professor Charles
Bazerman, a founder in the field of genre studies, did some of his
pioneering work by analyzing the U.S. patent application.247 From
his study, we can glean the general principles applicable to
transactional legal genres. Looking at the history of patent
applications, the forms, and the process of granting the application,
Bazerman finds “a complex web of interrelated genres where each
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459
(2004).
244
Hammond, supra note 242, at 409–14.
245
Bridgitte Norlyk, Conflicts In Professional Discourse: Language, Law
and Real Estate, in ANALYZING PROFESSIONAL GENRES 163, 168 (Anna
Trosbord ed., 2000). Over the past 20 years or so the Plain Language Movement
has tried to address the structured conventions of transactional legal writing by
making legal language more accessible to non-lawyers. See Julie A. Baker, And
the Winner Is: How Principles of Cognitive Science Resolve the Plain Language
Debate, 80 UMKC L. REV. 287, 288–95 (2011) (concluding that plain language
does not mean simple language, necessarily, and that an effective legal writer
chooses language from across the spectrum “to achieve credibility and
persuasive force”).
246
Norlyk, supra note 245, at 168 (citing BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE,
supra note 17).
247
See, e.g., CHARLES BAZERMAN, CONSTRUCTING EXPERIENCE (1984).
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participant makes a recognizable act or move in some recognizable
genre, which then may be followed by a certain range of
appropriate generic responses by others.”248 As Bawarshi and Reiff
elaborate in their comprehensive book on genre:
Bazerman suggests that a genre system includes
genres from multiple genre sets, over time, and can
involve the interaction of users with different levels
of expertise and authority, who may not all have
equal knowledge of or access to all the genres
within the system. Yet, the relationship of the
genres to one another, coordinated through a series
of appropriately timed and expected uptakes,
enables their users to enact complex social actions
over time—in this case, enabling the approval or
denial of a patent grant.249
Echoing Bazerman’s conclusion, without citing him,
practitioner Scott W. Cummings describes the genre of the patent
application process, in a publication for the American Intellectual
Property Law Association as “daunting.” The patent genre is
myriad substantive and formal legal requirements because patent
applications are “ideally written with an extremely diverse
audience in mind: the inventor(s); the patent office examiner; IP
counsel/tech transfer; investors; CEOs and other corporate officers;
prospective licensee(s); potential infringer(s); and IP litigators
(both hostile and friendly).”250 Cummings also lists nine distinct
aspects of the patent genre.251 Without using the term “genre,”
248

Charles Bazerman, Systems of Genres and the Enactment of Social
Intentions, in GENRE IN THE NEW RHETORIC 79, 96–97 (Aviva Freedman &
Peter Medway eds., 1994).
249
BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 88.
250
Scott W. Cummings, An Overview of Application Drafting and
Provisional
Applications,
AIPLA
(August
2009),
available
at
http://www.aipla.org/Test Document Library/2010/pppt/Cummings_Paper.pdf.
251
Id. at 3. Those elements are: (1) describe the invention adequately so
that one skilled in the art can understand and practice it; (2) disclose the best
mode for carrying out the invention; (3) describe all features that may be
necessary to support a claim that distinguishes the invention from the prior art;
(4) claim the invention narrowly enough to avoid the prior art; (5) claim the
invention broadly enough to prevent competitors from designing around the
patent; (6) claim the invention clearly enough to put the public on notice as to
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Cummings essentially describes the Patent Application genre and
how it habituates uptake, which “inform[s] our expectations and
intentions as we encounter, experience, and negotiate the seams
between genres.”252
Estate planning documents constitute another transaction
document sub-genre. In a pair of recent articles, Mercer University
School of Law legal writing professor Karen J. Sneddon offers a
comprehensive discussion of the importance of genre bias in estate
planning documents and the issues raised by violating that
genre.253 She notes that:
Wills are a stable genre where the language must be
substantively operative and accurate. One
seemingly innocuous word change can alter the
meaning of a bequest and can trigger a series of
unintended consequences. This has led to the
replication of the form and substance of wills for
hundreds of years. And yet, while there are
identifiable characteristics of the genre of wills,
wills are not mere mechanized copies of documents
drafted decades ago. Each will is unique. “For the
writer-craftsman the genre serves as an external
template, but the great artist awakens the semantic
possibilities that lie within it.” Each document in a
genre, including the genre of wills, involves “a great
deal of individual choice, for not every aspect of
every text is specified by any genre. Within any
genre, there is a great deal of ‘free’ variation.” Each
reviewed will acknowledges the expected form and
what the applicant considers to be their property; (7) contain only factually
accurate statements in order to avoid charges of lack of enforceability due to
inequitable conduct; (8) satisfy the requirements for patentability of various
countries around the world; and (9) tell a good story. Id.
252
BAWARSHI & REIFF, supra note 27, at 90.
253
See Sneddon, In the Name of God, supra note 181 (using rhetorical
artifacts to detect the features, utility, and objectives of the genre of wills in
estate planning); Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills
and Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 683 (2011) [hereinafter Sneddon,
Speaking for the Dead] (examining the independent voice in wills, and the role
and significance of accurate and operative wills).
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substance of the genre. And yet, each will also
acknowledges the needs of a particular individual
testator.254
Sneddon proceeds to identify the five preserved ritual
characteristics that “form the core” of the will sub-genre: “(1) the
lyrical title of ‘Last Will and Testament,’ (2) the invocation in the
introduction, (3) the weighty gift, bequest, and devise of the rest,
residue, and remainder; (4) the duty-laden nomination of executors
and trustees; and (5) the resonating closing.”255 In this
comprehensive treatment of a sub-genre, Sneddon demonstrates
the socio-cognitive aspects of genre to which all lawyers need to
be attuned. Sneddon’s article should be a model for application to
and analysis of other sub-genres, be they transactional documents
and litigation documents.
2. Example of Litigation Sub-Genre: The Appellate Brief
Lawyers litigate. They have, for centuries, in courthouses on
every corner of the globe. The lineage and ubiquity of this
recurrent rhetorical situation offers fertile ground for genre
analysis, yet scholarship is scant. The most extensive genre
analysis of the litigation sub-genre is a hard-to-find book entitled
Legal Discourse Across Cultures and Systems.256 In the United
States, Professor James Stratman delved into the effect of cognitive
biases in connection with the specific litigation sub-genres. In
254

Sneddon, In the Name of God, supra note 181, at 686–87 (citation
omitted).
255
Id. at 694.
256
See generally LEGAL DISCOURSE ACROSS CULTURES, supra note 207.
The book was unavailable at any library in Illinois, which includes extensive
collections at University of Chicago and Northwestern University. The library at
Dominican University purchased the book for its collection at the request of the
author. The book “investigates the linguistic and discoursal properties of legal
documents used in international commercial arbitration contexts, focusing on
their construction, interpretation, and use in international arbitration practice.”
Id. at vii. The growth in international trade and the resort to arbitration for
resolution of the resulting disputes was the impetus for the project. In a chapter
after chapter the authors explored the recurrent situations, the form and
substance of the sub-genre of international commercial arbitration. See generally
id.
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1994, for example, Stratman explored the appellate brief subgenre, seeking to understand the cognitive processes of both the
writer (lawyer) and the reader (clerk and judge).257 Summarizing
earlier studies by Benoit,258 Stratman concludes that appellate
writers are more effective when their briefs provide the reader with
what the reader expects.259 Stratman’s study affirms the primacy of
genre in the persuasive process. Emphasizing cognitive-response
theory260 and citing Professor William Benoit’s studies of
argumentative strategies used before the Supreme Court,261
Stratman notes the importance of the initial presentation of the
argument to its ultimate success or failure.262 Brief-readers’ own
memories (or schemata) influence their cognition, and the template
that is the sub-genre of the appellate brief offers the surest, safest
route to winning.
It is easy to see why Stratman’s conclusions are true. As
explained above, the Yates and Orlikowski’s model looks first to
the recurrent situation. With an appeal, the well-established
practice in which the social relations between judge and attorney,
and attorney and attorney, are highly proscribed. Within that
community, communication is only through the written brief,

257

See James F. Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal
Discourse in Real Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal
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[hereinafter Benoit, Attorney Argumentation].
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See Stratman, supra note 257, at 15.
260
Cognitive response theory emphasizes the causal role the argument
receiver’s own thought processes may play in persuasion. See Anthony G.
Greenwald, Cognitive Learning, Cognitive Response to Persuasion, and Attitude
Change, in PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ATTITUDES 147, 149 (1968)
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followed by oral argument, then ending with a written opinion.263
The form and substance of each step is highly structured, such that
failure to follow the prescriptions can result in dismissal of the
case entirely.264 The form of the appeal requires “observable
physical and linguistic features of the communications,”265 which
are set by court rules266 in many cases, and violation of those rules
is grounds for rejection of the text entirely. Judge Richard Posner
put it this way: “We are not sticklers, precisians, nitpickers, or
sadists. But in an era of swollen appellate dockets, courts are
entitled to insist on meticulous compliance with rules sensibly
designed to make appellate briefs as valuable an aid to the
decisional process as they can be.”267
263

See The Appeals Process, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/TheAppealsPro
cess.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
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For example, in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1998),
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confer jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal, even though it was obvious that the
appellant intended to appeal the entire lower court decision. Id. at 317–18. In a
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established genre, Justice Scalia wrote in his concurrence:
The principle that “mere technicalities” should not stand in the
way of deciding a case on the merits is more a prescription for
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procedure are technicalities; sanction for failure to comply
with them always prevents the court from deciding where
justice lies in the particular case, on the theory that securing a
fair and orderly process enables more justice to be done in the
totality of cases.
Id. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The substance of the appeal is also constrained. The motives
of the actors are always the same: the appellant wants reversal, the
appellee wants affirmation, and the court wants to get it right.
Each of their respective communications is penned with this
“given” in mind and read accordingly. But is there a choice to do
otherwise and be a maverick?
3. Bucking the Bias by Breaking the Genre
a. General Rule: Don’t Break the Genre
Recommendation: in transactional documents, don’t ever break
the genre. It is that simple. With regard to litigation documents like
appellate briefs, the answer is a bit modified: don’t ever break the
genre, unless there is a very compelling reason.
Pause. Here is why. Breaking the genre comes with risk—risk
because you as a writer are thwarting the expectations of your
reader. Think of the mystery book that ends without resolution,268
the fairytale in which the main characters do not live happily ever
after,269 or the action film where the star is killed in the middle of
the story, while walking out of a bathroom.270 Each exemplifies a
case where the author broke the genre—bold, yes, but effective?
Maybe not. The consequence of this authorial choice is usually
reader frustration,271 or disappointment,272 or simply obscurity of
268

E.g., TANA FRENCH, IN THE WOODS (reprt. ed. 2008) (writing her debut
book, French concludes a murder mystery investigation with the discovery of an
item, the meaning of which is inconclusive to the reader).
269
For example, The Juniper Tree by the Brothers Grimm offers a tale of
murder, cannibalism, and decapitation. See JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM K.
GRIMM, THE JUNIPER TREE: AND OTHER TALES FROM GRIMM 316 (Lore Segal &
Randall Jarrell trans., 1973).
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See PULP FICTION (Miramax Films 1994).
271
Steve Fuller, an Amazon.com reviewer of In the Woods, wrote a review
typical of other readers’ feelings. Fuller wrote:
Spoiler: To me, it’s unforgivable to write a mystery novel in
which the mystery isn’t resolved . . . . The unforgivable part is
creating a secondary mystery (which, to me, became the
primary mystery) that is left completely unresolved. I’ve never
been so angry. I felt betrayed. Which is the sad part, because
other than that monumental betrayal, I loved French’s writing
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the work,273 although there are exceptions. Viewers of Pulp Fiction
may have been left bewildered when, in the middle of the movie,
Butch Coolidge shoots Vincent Vega, who is coming out of the
bathroom, but the movie won an Academy Award.274 Similarly,
while In the Woods’s non-resolution frustrates readers, critics
nonetheless love it.275
Therefore, the general rule is then: do not break the genre
unless there is a powerful reason to do so, and you are uniquely
positioned by the situation and your skill to effect the move
successfully. This is because “genres function simultaneously as
premises to arguments and as metaphors for thinking.”276 For
example, consider that the “cross-examination” genre functions as
“a cognitive instrument for doing the rhetorical and pragmatic
work of text production and interpretation, work that results both
in a greater understanding of the ‘cross-examination-ness’ of a
particular legal text and the possibilities and constraints of the
style.
Steve Fuller, Comment to In the Woods Customer Reviews, AMAZON (February
7, 2012), http://www.amazon.com/gp/cdp/member-reviews/A2VY8CO6V76Q3/
ref=cm_pdp_rev_title_1?ie=UTF8&sort_by=MostRecentReview#R2Q8KK23H
XFCO.
272
Another reviewer of In the Woods wrote, “No, I don’t think every novel
has to conclude with everything nicely tidied up, but when I turned the last page
I was just left with a feeling of disappointment.” Avid Reader, Comment
to In the Woods Customer Reviews, AMAZON (August 12, 2007), http://www.
amazon.com/review/R33KVH8W2927C6/ref=cm_srch_res_rtr_alt_3.
273
Juniper Tree has yet to be made into a Disney cartoon, and likely won’t
be. See Stacy Conradt et al., 8 Fairy Tales and Their No-So-Happy
Endings, MENTAL FLOSS (Dec. 14, 2007, 11:30 AM), http://mentalfloss.com/
article/17601/8-fairy-tales-and-their-not-so-happy-endings.
274
Pulp Fiction won the 1995 Academy Award for Best Original
Screenplay.
Awards
for
Pulp
Fiction,
IMDB,
http://www.
imdb.com/title/tt0110912/awards?ref_=tt_awd (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
275
In the Woods won numerous awards for Best First Novel. See
Barry Awards, DEADLY PLEASURES, http://www.deadlypleasures.com/
barry.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); History of Guests of Honor
and Anthony Award Winners, BOUCHERCON WORLD MYSTERY CONVENTION,
http://www.bouchercon.info/history.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); Macavity
Awards, MYSTERY READERS INTERNATIONAL, http://www.mysteryreaders.org/
macavity.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
276
Kamberelis, supra note 23, at 157.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

248

cross-examination genre.”277 Genres are persuasively powerful
because they paradoxically explain texts, but not fully. Genres
channel readers’ minds. Like metaphors, genres “lead us to
perceive that similarity in the midst of and in spite of
difference.”278 The effectiveness of genres lies, therefore, not so
much in their cognitive “powers of classification but in their
powers of clarification and generativity.”279 That is, genres are not
just buckets into which we place different types of texts, but more
important genres help us understand, and stimulate thought—and
that is genre bias.
There is an important distinction when considering the
recommendation of whether to break the genre with respect to
transactional documents as opposed to litigation documents.
Pleadings, briefs and the like are generally temporary, singlepurpose, finite writings. Such documents either work for the
intended audience in the moment, or they do not, and then the
litigants and judges move on. In this way, the litigation legal
writing sub-genre is akin to a pitch in a baseball game. The pitcher
attempts to persuade the batter to swing and miss, hit a ground ball,
or take the pitch looking as the umpire yells “strike three.” The
audience and the rhetorical situation are clearly defined. Similarly,
momentary in its essence, the litigation document’s purpose
happens then fleets.
By contrast, transactional documents are most often not
grounded in a moment or circumstance and their ultimate
application and user often unknown. The contract drafted today
could be relied on by unknown buyers years hence, as could the
lease or promissory note. Wills, and many other transactional
documents, are ambulatory—they amble through time. In this way,
the transactional legal writing genre is more akin to a baseball
stadium than a pitch thrown in that stadium. Built in 1914, Wrigley
Field has played host to the likes of Ernie Banks, Kerry Wood,
Gale Sayers, Dick Butkus, Paul McCartney, and even Patrick
Kane.280 The builders of this “Green Cathedral”281 could not have
277
278
279
280

Id.
Id. at 157–58 (quoting ADENA ROSMARIN, THE POWER OF GENRE 46).
Id. at 158.
The Cubs, Bears, a former Beatle, and even Blackhawks have all played
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foreseen all the uses for their project, and yet today, a century after
it was built, Wrigley proves functional, even exceptional.
Similarly, the drafters of transactional documents, wills, leases,
and the like are creating texts for unknown readers of an unknown
time, in an unknown place, and for use in a to-be-determined
situation.
The fleeting nature of persuasive documents and the enduring
existence of transactional documents is a distinction that matters in
deciding whether to break the genre. As demonstrated below,
while there may be rare occasions where you can break the genre
in a brief or other persuasive document, that circumstance never
applies to transactional documents. The difference comes from the
audience’s knowledge and the rhetorical situation in which the text
is used. With litigation documents, the audience—the judge—is
known to the advocate, and the exact contours of the use of the text
are known as well. Breaking the genre comes at great cost, but it
may be worth it. That calculation can be made because the
variables are known.
In contrast to the ephemeral nature of persuasive documents, in
some cases, wills are being probated that were drafted decades ago
by lawyers likely long dead. The works of legal writing, maybe
from the hand of the long since dead, are now read and interpreted
by judges and heirs not only unknown at the time of drafting, but
who may not have even been born at the time the document was
written.282 The high degree of uncertainty as to when transactional
at Wrigley Field, also known as the Friendly Confines. Also, soccer has seen its
turn on the field, but this author is not a soccer fan so cannot cite to any player
by name.
281
For those who have experienced the Friendly Confines, there is no need
to prove the point. For those unfortunate who have not, see PHILIP LOWRY,
GREEN CATHEDRALS: THE ULTIMATE CELEBRATION OF ALL MAJOR LEAGUE
BALLPARKS 54–58 (2006).
282
Under Illinois law, original wills must be filed in the county in which
the decedent was residing on the day of death within thirty days of death. 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-1 (West 2010). A review of the January and
February 2013 will filings in Lake County, Illinois Circuit Court by the author
revealed ninety-seven wills filed in a range from the most recent dated two
weeks prior to the decedent’s death, to the joint and mutual will of Emmett and
Carol Burdick who in 1970 executed a will in their home town of Beaver Dam,
Wisconsin, a will that took effect forty-three years later. The average age of the
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documents will “kick in” and who they will affect makes tinkering
with the “rules of the game”—the genre — something to be left on
lawyers’ scroll of things “never done.” Now that we have
completed a general overview, let’s dive into the two specific
arenas of the legal writing sub-genres.
b. Breaking the Genre in Opinions, Briefs, or Other Pleadings
“Genres can be seen as constituting a kind of tacit contract
between authors and readers.”283 While breaking a contract is often
wrong, it is not always unwise.284 So if genre is a contract, should a
litigator break the genre in a brief or other pleading, or a judge
break the genre in an opinion? Generally, the answer is no—but
sometimes and rarely, the answer is maybe. Whether a lawyer
should create that hurdle is a decision fraught with high risk, and
yet pregnant with potential pay-off. The risk is outright rejection.
The pay-off is standing out from the crowd and thereby grabbing
the reader’s attention, to some point otherwise lost in the
ordinariness of the genre true text.
Breaking the genre can knock your entire argument off kilter.
Famously, this happened in the landmark case Roe v. Wade,285
when the male attorney for the State of Texas, commenting on his
female opposing counsel, broke the oral argument genre by telling
a joke. Jay Floyd opened his argument the following:
MR. FLOYD: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the
Court:. [sic] It’s an old joke, but when a man argues
against two beautiful ladies like this, they are going
filed wills was eleven years.
283
Daniel Chandler, An Introduction to Genre Theory, http://www.
aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/intgenre/intgenre.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
See also Sonia Livingstone, The Rise and Fall of Audience Research: An Old
Story with a New Ending, in DEFINING MEDIA STUDIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
FUTURE OF THE FIELD 247–54 (Mark R. Levy & Michael Gurevitch eds., 2004)
(“[D]ifferent genres specify different ‘contracts’ to be negotiated between the
text and the reader . . . which set up expectations on each side for the form of
communication . . ., its functions . . ., its epistemology . . ., and the
communicative frame.”).
284
For an interesting discussion of the morality of breaching contracts, see
Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439 (2006).
285
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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to have the last word.286
“Painful silence” greeted the joke and Mr. Floyd “struggled to
regain momentum throughout the argument, according to one
observer.”287
Mr. Floyd’s example of breaking the genre represents clearly
what not to do.288 Rarely, however, breaking the genre can have a
powerful positive effect in the right context. Exceptions also define
the outer-boundaries of the rule. If you look to when the legal
writing genre has been broken, two examples come to mind, and
both, not so surprisingly, are dissenting opinions. The sub-genre of
the judicial opinion is well-established.289 One example of
breaking the judicial genre is Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent from
the grant of certiorari in Pennsylvania v. Dunlap,290 which he
began as follows:
North Philly, May 4, 2001. Officer Sean Devlin,
Narcotics Strike Force, was working the morning
286

Transcript of First Oral Argument at 15, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (No.70-18).
287
Geoffrey Sant, 8 Horrible Courtroom Jokes and Their Ensuing Legal
Calamities, SALON (July 26, 2013, 2:42 PM), http://www.salon.com/
2013/07/26/8_horrible_courtroom_jokes_and_their_ensuing_legal_calamity/.
288
One commentator, Josiah Jenkins, even speculates that this misstep
played a role in the case going against the state. Life of the Law: Episode 5,
Tough Crowd (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.lifeofthelaw.org/breaking-down-thelaw-episode-5-how-to-survive-an-irs-audit/ (“[T]he most amazing thing is not
just how bad the joke was, but how bad it was for the setting. Arguing in 1971,
in the midst of a cultural revolution, Jay Floyd should have done everything he
could to downplay abortion as women’s rights issue. Instead he highlighted
gender roles and in all the wrong ways. Roe v. Wade would actually be argued a
second time, and that time Jay Floyd wouldn’t get to represent the state. Jane
Roe’s lawyer had been too unfocused on the first argument, but she came ready
on the second trip and found an argument that would persuade the court. In
essence, with his corn-pone humor, Jay Floyd ruined the state’s best opportunity
for a knock-out blow.”).
289
See GEORGE, supra note 18, at 331–58 (discussing judicial opinion
genre); Hafner, supra note 16 (clarifying that the genre of judicial opinions is
prevalent). See generally Tarja Salmi-Tolonen, Persuasion in Judicial
Argumentation: The Opinions of the Advocates General at the European Court
of Justice, in PERSUASION ACROSS GENRES (Helena Halmari & Tuija Virtanen
eds., 2005).
290
555 U.S. 964, 964 (2008) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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shift. Undercover surveillance. The neighborhood?
Tough as a three dollar steak. Devlin knew. Five
years on the beat, nine months with the Strike
Force. He’d made fifteen, twenty drug busts in the
neighborhood.
Devlin spotted him: a lone man on the corner.
Another approached. Quick exchange of words.
Cash handed over; small objects handed back. Each
man then quickly on his own way. Devlin knew the
guy wasn’t buying bus tokens. He radioed a
description and Officer Stein picked up the buyer.
Sure enough: three bags of crack in the guy’s
pocket. Head downtown and book him. Just another
day at the office.291
Sounding more like novelist Raymond Chandler,292 Roberts
shattered the genre of what a Supreme Court opinion statement of
facts should be.
Another example comes from U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, who penned a stinging
dissent to a court opinion upholding the conviction of Juan
Ramirez-Lopez for smuggling illegal immigrants.293 His dissent
was structured as a conversation between the losing lawyer and the
client, Mr. Ramirez-Lopez. The lawyer explained how the trial was
fair, and the dissent, with a heaping dose of sarcastic dialogue,
made clear the error of the majority. The U.S. Department of
Justice dropped all charges and released the defendant, avoiding
express acknowledgment of the push from Kozinski’s dissent.294
This is a prime, and rare, example of where breaking genre is
actually effective. What credit goes to the logic of the dissent, and
what credit goes to the fact that he broke the genre may never be
known, but what is clear is that the dissent was very unusual; so
291

Id.
See Mark Sherman, Chief Justice Channels His Inner Raymond
Chandler, USA TODAY (Oct. 15, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/washington/2008-10-14-3790306095_x.htm.
293
United States v. Ramirez-Lopez, 315 F.3d 1143, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003),
withdrawn, 327 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2003).
294
See Henry Weinstein, Appeal Lost, Yet Freedom Won, L.A. TIMES
(April 23, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/apr/23/local/me-free23.
292
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was the Justice Department’s response—some causation is certain.
While judges like Roberts and Kozinksi may take license with
opinion sub-genre, there are at least three strong reasons why
lawyers should carefully weigh the high costs against any possible
benefit before doing so. First, judges are busy.295 Dockets are
packed. Putting before a judge a brief that confounds the genre also
confounds the judge. As one commenter noted, brief readers
expecting “specific information in specific places” would find it
“frustrating to look throughout the brief to find” that
information.296And frustrated readers are less persuadable
readers.297
For example, take the case of Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest
River, Inc.298 involving the “motion to strike” portions of the
opponent’s brief. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook denied the motion and, in doing so,
powerfully endorsed the reason to stick with the established
appellate genre proscriptions. His frustration pervades the opinion.
He wrote, “[o]ne can search the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure in vain without finding any provision for a ‘motion to
strike’ whole document, let alone to strike sentences out of
briefs.”299 The lawyer, who took the risk, lost the gamble. Judge
295

Not just judges for that matter. Opposing lawyers, clients and cocounsel read legal documents and they are busy, too. See RICHARD K.
NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE,
STRATEGY AND STYLE 52 (5th ed. 2005) (“[T]he legal reader is a busy person,
must read quickly, and cannot afford to read twice.”).
296
Legal Brief Genre Analysis, JASON D. MACLEOD, http://www.
jasondmacleod.com/legal-articles-2/legal-genre-analysis/.
297
Sean Flammer, Persuading Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Writing
Style, Persuasion, and the Use of Plain English, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST.
183, 184 (2010); see also Baker, supra note 245, at 298 (“Research has shown
that where people are unfamiliar with the truth of a statement, fluency is one
factor that the mind considers.”).
298
464 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2006).
299
Id. at 726–27. Judge Easterbrook continued:
[D]espite the fact that motions to strike portions of briefs are
not authorized by the rules and are not only unnecessary (from
the parties’ perspective) but also pointless (from the
judiciary’s), they are filed all the time. I see about one such
motion during each week that I act as motions judge. I have
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Easterbrook subtracted from the movant’s reply brief the number
of pages wasted on the “beyond the genre” motion to strike.300
Second, offering a brief outside the genre can engender a dose
of dread and even offend the reader. There is strong research
showing that delivering a text within a genre provides the reader
with both emotional and cognitive pleasure.301 This pleasure is
derived in part from the reader knowing where the text is going
and having those expectations fulfilled.302 Expectations unmet lead
to frustration. Professor of communication and the director of the
Annenberg Public Policy Center at University of Pennsylvania
Kathleen Hall Jamieson explains it this way:
When the rhetorical parameters established by the
generic tradition are overstepped, reaction is
provoked. One element in the implied contract
between rhetoric and audience is a clause
stipulating that that he fulfill rather than frustrate
the expectations created for the audience by existing
genre.303
More recently, Henry Jenkins, Provost’s Professor of
Communication, Journalism, and Cinematic Arts at University of
California at Los Angeles, summarizing a thesis submitted by Alec
Austin, reiterated that the violation of a genre is a violation of a

Id.

never granted such a motion (and never will); I don’t believe
that any of my colleagues grants such motions; yet the flow
continues.
300

Id. at 727.
Chandler, supra note 284 (citing Stephen Neale, Questions of Genre, in
APPROACHES TO MEDIA: A READER 460 (Oliver Boyd-Barrett & Chris Newbold
eds., 1990)).
302
Id. (citing NICHOLAS ABERCROMBIE, TELEVISION AND SOCIETY, 43
(1996)); see also Ashley Rexford, A Meditation on the Effects of Genre, ULOOP
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://ucdavis.uloop.com/news/view.php/64294/a-meditationon-the-effects-of-genre (“If the book we are reading violates these expectations,
we feel violated as readers. Our trust has been betrayed, and we are left
wondering why this book is labeled in such a way if it is not doing the job
intended for it to do.”).
303
Kathleen M. Hall Jamieson, Generic Constraints and the Rhetorical
Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 162, 167 (1973) [hereinafter Jamieson, Generic
Constraints].
301
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contract between writer and reader.304 Such a violation of genre
generally leaves the reader with three choices in an attempt “to
redress perceived contract violations:” first there is dissatisfaction,
which manifests itself in lessened engagement; second, there is
withdrawal, which is evidenced in the loss of the audience member
as a viewer; or finally there is an audience boycott, which
manifests itself in a reader actively trying to dissuade others from
supporting or engaging with a text.305
These three negative outcomes of breaking the genre are
particularly true with lawyers who submit writings that violate the
proper genre because lawyering, even more than the arts, is a
profession that privileges standardization. As Gibbons points out,
“it is not in the interest of lawyers to produce new wordings
because it may expose them to challenge”306 and “[t]hat is the fear
that freezes lawyers and their language. It is precise now. We are
safe with it now. Leave us alone. Don’t change. Here we stay till
death or disbarment.”307 Lawyers pay heed; genre flouters foster
frustration.
All the research cited above counsels against breaking the
genre. In the only published study of its kind, Stratman
methodically studied how cognitive biases may develop in brief
writers, how those biases may affect their generation and strategic
assessment of persuasive techniques, and how the readers (law
clerks and judges) may react in initial and subsequent readings of
the brief.308 In that study, Stratman first found that the brief
reading played a pivotal role in appellate court decision-making.
Stratman cited two stages of the reading: the initial reading and
then a reflective reading when the judge is writing the opinion.309
304

Henry Jenkins, Genre Theory and Implicit Contracts, CONFESSIONS OF
(May 4, 2007),
http://henryjenkins.org/2007/05/genre_theory_and_implicit_cont.html.
305
Id.
306
GIBBONS, supra note 17, at 23–24 (quoting MELLINKOFF, supra note 17,
at 295).
307
Id. at 24 (quoting MELLINKOFF, supra note 17, at 295).
308
See James F. Stratman, Investigating Persuasive Processes in Legal
Discourse in Real Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical Strategy in Appeal
Court Briefs, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESS 1 (1994).
309
Id. at 15, 49.
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Without discussing genre per se, Stratman explored the vital role
that the argument-receiver’s own thought processes play before,
during, and after initial exposure to the argument.310 A briefreader’s cognition is highly influenced by what “the receiver is
thinking when a message is first presented, and the amount and
kind of thinking that the receiver may use to evaluate the message
upon initial presentation, may be equally important as any
rhetorical technique used in the message medium itself.”311 In
other words, first impressions matter. And while a certain level of
surprise in a story—called a narrative rug pull—can be
entertaining, it is not persuasive.312
Even worse than merely frustrating your reader, breaking genre
may even boomerang. By way of example, in an appeal brought by
this author seeking to reverse a post-decree change of custody, the
central issue was the importance of stability and the need for the
children to stay in their longtime hometown. The conclusion in the
reply brief was simply this:
Family Courts frequently and rightly talk about
the importance of stability for a child. Children talk
about it too. A child’s home is his source of comfort
and stability. In a collection of poems written by
children entitled Home Sweet Home, Michael, age
9, says it simply:
My room is blue, it’s real cool,
It keeps me safe at night.
I never fight.
I like my bike.
I like to fly a kite.
But most of all,
I like my room.
And now I say goodnight.
310

Id. at 18–42.
Id. at 15 (citing R. Perloff & T. Brock, And Thinking Makes It So:
Cognitive Responses to Persuasion, in PERSUASION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
THEORY AND RESEARCH 74–76 (M. Roloff & G. Miller eds., 1980)).
312
Vera Tobin, Cognitive Bias and the Poetics of Surprise, 18 LANGUAGE
& LIT. 155, 157 (2009) (explaining that surprise in a story works because it
plays on the reader’s “curse of knowledge”—a cognitive bias, that allows
readers to over-generalize, and then be surprised by the narrative rug-pull).
311
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Ottawa was T’s home. Ottawa was D. Jr.’s
home. The children should have stayed in their
home unless demonstrable detriment was alleged
and proven. Here, the trial court expressly chose not
to apply the detriment standard. And, still, the trial
court ordered the children away from their home. It
should not have done that. A remand is called for.313
The California Court of Appeals appeared offended. In its
conclusion denying the appeal, the court wrote:
In arguing the court erred by not applying the
detriment standard [appellant] relies on secondary
sources, and even poetry, on the importance of
stability in children’s living arrangements . . . . It
remains, however, that in addressing [appellant’s]
argument the court was required to follow
established legal precedent. We find no error . . . .314
To be sure, a brief can be written in narrative form because a
story is an accepted in the genre. But verse may go too far afield
for some judges. As Santa Clara University School of Law
professor Stephen Smith notes, “[w]hen poetic form appears in
obvious ways in a piece of legal writing, it is without question a
curiosity and, perhaps, an object of ridicule. A brief should rarely,
if ever, be a poem.”315 And at least in one California Court of
Appeals, a brief should rarely, if ever, recite one either.
The third, and most important, reason not to break the genre is
that doing so lessens the cognitive, and therefore, persuasive
effects of genre bias. As discussed above, genre bias can be used to
your advantage. Genre is a cognitive “spoon full of sugar” that
makes it easier to swallow the weighty argument. That is, genre
bias is a palliative device that makes a difficult reading a little less
unpleasant, and an already pleasant reading even more so. Why
would you, as a writer, ever forsake that advantage?
If a litigator breaks the proscribed genre he or she should likely
313

Appellant’s Reply Brief at *8–9, Geiger v. Geiger, No. DO61114, 2012
WL 6178289 (Cal. App. 4th Feb. 12, 2012), 2012 WL 3117094.
314
Geiger v. Geiger, No. DO61114, 2012 WL 6178289, at *6 (Cal. App.
4th Feb. 12, 2012).
315
Stephen E. Smith, The Poetry of Persuasion: Early Literary Theory and
Its Advice to Legal Writers, 6 J. ALWD 55, 55 (2009).
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be prepared for the judge to wince and react with a level of
frustration, anger, and repulse. Thus the decision of a legal writer
to take this bold step should only be employed in circumstances
where the following factors are present. First, the likelihood of
winning the motion or case by staying within the genre is remote.
Second, it is essential to get the judge’s attention and stand out as
not being a run-of-the-mill case. Finally, determine if the judge is
going to be even remotely receptive to breaking the genre. Is this
judge a stickler for rules, or is she receptive to presentation that is
“outside the box?” For example, given Judge Easterbrook’s
general hostility to texts that vary from the rules, filing a brief with
poetry before that court would prove foolish. By contrast, and
perhaps most famously, at the turn of the twentieth century, thenattorney Louis Brandeis filed a brief in Muller v. Oregon316 that
broke the genre by relying on social science (110 pages of the
brief) rather than legal precedent (two pages of the brief) to
support his client’s position.317 Although his success in breaking
the genre to create a new sub-genre that has become a “staple”318
of Supreme Court practice, it establishes that there are ever-so-rare
circumstances where breaking genre can be effective. Few of us,
however, write like Louis Brandeis—very few.
c. Breaking the Genre in Transactional Documents
Never, ever, ever break the genre with a transactional
document. As explained above, these documents are ambulatory
and their ultimate application and users unknown. However, as
Kristin Davis notes, not breaking the genre is different from blind
adherence to a generic form.319 In the only article to address the

316

208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Brief for the Appellant, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No.
107), 1908 WL 27605; see also THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 100 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
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Id. at 101.
319
Davis, supra note 38, at 709 (citing Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Sawers, 903
N.E.2d 309, 310 (Ohio 2009) (holding that it was misconduct for a lawyer to use
a generic trust document for a client and make no effort to adapt that document
to the client’s needs)).
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question directly,320 Sneddon urges lawyers to reject the strict
strictures of the wills sub-genre by using language that
personalizes the document and incorporates the testator’s
subjective “voice.”321 She raises some genre-analysis-related
questions. What are the implications of an attorney drafting a will
with conscious disregard to the established genre?322 How will a
will imbued with the subjectiveness of the testator’s voice be
received by the intended audience—heirs and judges?323 Sneddon
speculatively provides some answers, and her analysis is
intriguing.
Ultimately, however, infusing a will with the testator’s
subjective voice is a risk better left untaken. As a practicing estate
plan attorney, the author and his estate planning colleagues are
always mindful that using established language and forms is
nowhere more necessary than in estate planning. This sub-genre
relies on an established entrenched understanding among attorneys
and conveys the testator’s present intent to the future decedent’s
audience—heirs and judges. The strong bias created by the
entrenched sub-genre of wills counsels lawyers to religiously
adhere to the genre. Sneddon’s entreaty to tinker with that genre
should be met with trepidation. The “understanding” that comes
from reliance on the established sub-genre can have real-world
consequences.
Recently in Fifth Third Bank, N.A. v. Rosen, in the context of
litigation over the meaning of an estate plan, the Illinois Appellate
Court spoke about the importance of adhering to genre, holding
that the use of technical language governed.324 At issue was the
term “taxable estate,” and the difference in interpretation of that
could cost one side or the other millions of dollars.325 The court
noted that “[t]echnical terms with established meanings are
presumed to be used according to their technical meanings” and
lawyers who write documents are presumed to write within the
320
321
322
323
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genre.326 The application of that view controlled the outcome of
the case.327 In the estate planning context more broadly, Gerry W.
Beyer, cited by Sneddon, says as much:
[W]ills contain standardized provisions, [so] the
user may safely rely that the language of each form
will be the same every time the form is used . . . .
This uniformity allows the user to confidently
predict the results that will flow from the use of the
form. Past personal experience with the form,
legislation, and judicial decisions assist the user in
anticipating whether the will form will function as
intended.328
Genre matters because it establishes the conventions upon
which language is interpreted. What if the subjective voice of
testator in Rosen were used in place of technical language? How
would a court have been guided and constrained—or left to float
untethered—because the scrivener wanted the testator or his family
to be comforted by the will’s words? It is better for the client to put
what will be remembered as his or her emotional final thoughts in
a letter or a video329 than it is to tinker with a well-established legal
writing sub-genre. The purpose of the former is to salve grief,
while the latter is meant to be an executory document relating to
the transfer or property and wealth. Different purposes yield
different genres. This is not to criticize Sneddon but to commend
her. Her comprehensive analysis paves the way for understanding
why genre analysis should be done and how legal sub-genres
should be questioned. While suggesting breaking genres in an
academic paper is acceptable; rejecting them in practice is simply
A Bridge Too Far.
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VI. CONCLUSION
David Mellinkoff, in his classic book on legal language,
affirmed the obvious that “the law is a profession of words.”330
While true, the law is also a profession of genres. Lawyers are the
quintessential persuaders, and legal writing is their tool of the
trade.331 To be its most effective, that tool must generally fit within
the genre that the reader’s mind will most readily accept and
process. A reader readily accepting and processing text is the
function, and the consequence, of genre.332 Genre stimulates,
channels and accelerates cognition;333 in other words, genre bias.
Without those cognitive processes engaged by the legal texts, the
next steps—acceptance (for transactional documents) and
persuasion (for litigation documents)—become just that much
higher.
This Article offers only the start of a discussion about genre
bias and legal writing. Other issues need to be explored, including
how genres originate and change—for surely they do. As professor
Jamieson wrote forty years ago, “[b]y speaking of the effects of
generic classification as generic constraints, this essay may have
inadvertently suggested that generic classification is the boulder of
Sisyphus to rhetors and critics. Such need not be the case. Genres
should not be viewed as static forms but as evolving
phenomena.”334
But, if as this Article suggests, practitioners should not break
the genre, then who initiates the change? In part, change comes
from academia, and from the rule-makers, courts, and legislatures.
Unlike lawyers, these participants in the legal writing genre do not
answer to a client, and therefore, they are freer to stray. The plain
language movement of the 1970s and 1980s is a good example of
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how genre changes335—so too are modifications of rules of
procedure.336 Indeed, some argue that boilerplate can only change
when the system is “shocked” by a change in the marketplace.337
Sometimes it is a great lawyer, like Louis Brandeis, who reshapes
the generic landscape.
The consequence of these changes, their causes, and their
effectiveness are all issues that subsequent scholarship should
address. Here, my only purpose is to have the reader appreciate
that genre bias is a legal writer’s hidden persuader. Nothing more.
That genre, especially when used correctly, can gently channel the
reader toward the writer’s way of thinking. Genre is a cognitive
bias and should be treated as such.
In their book, Persuasion Across Genres, professors Helena
Halmari and Tuila Virtanen liken the cognitive process of what this
Article calls genre bias to the Aesop fable of The North Wind and
the Sun.338 It is apt, and I will use it too:
The North Wind and the Sun had a quarrel
about which of them was the stronger. While they
were disputing with much heat and bluster, a
Traveler passed along the road wrapped in a cloak.
“Let us agree,” said the Sun, “that he is the
335
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stronger who can strip that Traveler of his cloak.”
“Very well,” growled the North Wind, and at
once sent a cold, howling blast against the Traveler.
With the first gust of wind the ends of the cloak
whipped about the Traveler’s body. But he
immediately wrapped it closely around him, and the
harder the Wind blew, the tighter he held it to him.
The North Wind tore angrily at the cloak, but all his
efforts were in vain.
Then the Sun began to shine. At first his beams
were gentle, and in the pleasant warmth after the
bitter cold of the North Wind, the Traveler
unfastened his cloak and let it hang loosely from his
shoulders. The Sun’s rays grew warmer and
warmer. The man took off his cap and mopped his
brow. At last he became so heated that he pulled off
his cloak, and, to escape the blazing sunshine, threw
himself down in the welcome shade of a tree by the
roadside.339
If you ignore the gentle force of the applicable legal sub-genre
in the construction of a text, or try to force your way around it, like
the North Wind, you will likely leave the reader’s mind wrapped
closely to pre-existing beliefs, and your efforts at securing
acceptance and effecting persuasion may well be in vane.
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